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I.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

1.
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, et al., No. 12–515, 134 S. Ct.
2024 (2014). State of Michigan brought an action to enjoin an Indian tribe from
operating casino on land located outside its reservation that it had purchased with
earnings from a congressionally established land trust. The district court granted a
preliminary injunction, and the tribe appealed. The appellate court, 695 F.3d 406,
vacated the injunction and remanded. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court,
Justice Kagan, held that the suit was barred by tribal sovereign immunity. Affirmed.
II.

OTHER COURTS

A. Administrative Law
2.
California Valley Miwok Tribe v. Jewell, No. 11–00160, 2013 WL
6524636, __ F. Supp. 2d __ (D.D.C. 2013). This matter was before the Court on cross
motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs, led by Yakima Dixie, claim to be members of
the California Valley Miwok Tribe (Tribe). They challenged the August 31, 2011 final
decision of Larry Echo Hawk, the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) that reached the following conclusions: (1) the Tribe is a federally recognized
tribe; (2) the BIA cannot compel the Tribe to organize under the IRA and will cease all
efforts to do so absent a request from the Tribe; (3) the BIA cannot compel the Tribe to
expand its membership and will cease all efforts to do so absent a request from the
Tribe; (4) as of the date of the Decision, the Tribe’s entire citizenship consisted of
Yakima, Burley, Burley’s two daughters, and Burley’s granddaughter; and (5) the
November 1998 Resolution established a General Council comprised of all of the adult
citizens of the Tribe, with whom BIA may conduct government-to-government relations..
Federal Defendants Sally Jewell, Secretary of the DOI, Michael Black, Director of BIA,
and Larry Echo Hawk (collectively “the Federal Defendants”) opposed Plaintiffs’ motion
and requested that the Court affirm the August 31, 2011 decision.
At the Court’s request, Intervenor–Defendant, another group of individuals who
claimed to be members of the Tribe and who are led by Silvia Burley, filed a brief in
support of the Federal Defendants’ summary judgment motion. The Court concluded
that the Assistant Secretary erred when he assumed that the Tribe’s membership is
limited to five individuals and further assumed that the Tribe is governed by a duly
constituted tribal council, thereby ignoring multiple administrative and court decisions
that express concern about the nature of the Tribe’s governance.
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The Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment that sought remand of
the August 2011 Decision and denied the Federal Defendants’ cross motion for
summary judgment.
3.
Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Henriquez, No. CV–13–
01917, 2013 WL 6903750 (D. Ariz. 2013); 25 U.S.C. § 4101 et seq.; 25 C.F.R. § 2.6.	
  
Before the court was defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Chukchansi Indian Housing
Authority (CIHA) is the housing entity of the Picayune Tribe of Chukchansi Indians
(Tribe) established by tribal ordinance to operate the tribe’s federally assisted housing
programs. CIHA operates as a non-profit tribal corporation, governed by a Board of
Commissioners appointed by the Tribal Council. CIHA administers annual block grants
from the Southwest Office of Native American Programs (SWONAP) of the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The block grants are
provided through the Native American Housing Assistance and Self–Determination Act
of 1996 (NAHASDA), 25 U.S.C. § 4101 et seq., which requires that grants be paid by
HUD “directly to the recipient for the tribe.” Individuals authorized to receive the funds
are given access to an automated Line of Credit Control System (LOCCS), and can
access and withdraw NAHASDA funds through that system.
In January 2013, a leadership dispute arose among the members of the Tribal
Council, and various members of the Tribal Council attempted to suspend other
members. Three separate factions emerged from the leadership dispute, each claiming
to represent the government of the Tribe. The BIA advised HUD that the intra-tribal
dispute was currently the subject of an appeal and that, pursuant to 25 C.F.R. § 2.6,
there was no final BIA determination regarding the appropriate tribal government. As a
result, HUD informed CIHA, with copy to the heads of all three factions that, “all current
LOCCS users are hereby prohibited from accessing LOCCS.” HUD emphasized that it
was not suspending the Tribe’s funds, but rather revoking access to the LOCCS
system, and that access by new users would be allowed if HUD became “satisfied that
CIHA’s Board of Commissioners is in fact authorized and designated by a recognized
Tribal government.” CIHA initiated a suit against HUD, SWONAP, and their respective
representatives on behalf of itself and the Tribe.
The suit asserted that: (1) HUD suspended funds in violation of NAHASDA
because it had not shown that CIHA failed to “comply substantially” with statutory
requirements; (2) HUD’s suspension of funding violated the Administrative Procedures
Act because it was arbitrary, capricious and contrary to applicable law; (3) HUD violated
Plaintiff’s due process rights under the Fifth Amendment by failing to provide proper
notice or hearing prior to revoking CIHA’s access to LOCCS; (4) HUD violated federal
common law by failing to acknowledge the elected tribal council at the last undisputed
election; (5) Plaintiffs were entitled to declaratory relief regarding the recognition of tribal
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court orders which recognized the Ayala faction as the lawful governing body of the
Tribe; and (6) the government breached its fiduciary duty to the Tribe under NAHASDA.
Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction,
seeking to have access to LOCCS restored “for the CIHA officials who had that access
on and before August 22, 2013.” Plaintiffs thus sought to have the Ayala faction
granted exclusive access to the HUD funds.
The court found that Plaintiffs could not meet the burden of showing their injury
by Defendants’ actions. The Court also opined that Plaintiff's injury could not be
redressed by a court order without asking the Court to resolve matters of intra-tribal
governance. Plaintiffs therefore cannot show that they have standing to pursue this
action. The Court found Plaintiffs’ arguments and authorities unpersuasive, and elected
to follow cases that have dismissed similar claims.
The court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
4.
Alto v. Black, No. 12–56145, 738 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2013).	
   Descendants
of Indian tribal members filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the
Bureau of Indian Affairs’ (BIA) order upholding the tribe’s decision to disenroll
descendants from tribal membership. After granting intervention by the tribe to file
jurisdictional motions and after granting the descendants’ motion for preliminary
injunction, preventing enforcement of the disenrollment order, pending completion of
litigation, the District Court, 2012 WL 2152054, denied the tribe’s motion to dissolve the
preliminary injunction and the tribe’s motions to dismiss, for failure to join the tribe as
the required party and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Tribe appealed. The
appellate court held that: (1) descendants’ challenges to disenrollment order were
reviewable, and (2) tribe was not a required party. Affirmed in part, dismissed in part,
and remanded.
5.
Hester v. Jewell, No. 13–4142, 2014 WL 211868, __ Fed. Appx. __ (10th
Cir. 2014). Job applicant brought a pro se Title VII action against the Secretary of the
Department of Interior (DOI) and Department officials. The District Court, 2013 WL
5322625, dismissed sua sponte, and the applicant appealed. The appellate court held
that the application of Indian Preference to job postings within the DOI was not racial
discrimination under Title VII. Affirmed.
6.
Nambe Pueblo Housing Entity v. United States Dep’t of Housing and
Urban Dev., No. 11–CV–01516, 2014 WL 901511 (D. Colo. 2014). (From the opinion.)
This action is one of several related actions pending in this court involving challenges to
HUD’s reductions of the plaintiffs’ Indian Housing Block Grant (IHBG) awards pursuant
to 24 C.F.R. § 1000.318 and HUD’s authority to recapture purported grant overfunding.
The procedural history of the plaintiffs’ challenges to HUD’s elimination of Mutual Help
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units from their Formula Current Assisted Stock (FCAS) is described in this court’s
Memorandum Opinion dated August 31, 2012 in Fort Peck Housing Authority v. HUD et
al., Civil Action No. 05–cv–00018–RPM, which was also made applicable in this civil
action. This action is unique because Nambe Pueblo Housing Entity (Nambe) filed this
action in 2011, after the Native American Housing and Assistance and Self–
Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA) was amended by the Native American Housing
Assistance and Self–Determination Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–411,
122 Stat. 4319 (the “Reauthorization Act”).
The court found that HUD’s disallowance of FCAS funding for 23 units was
arbitrary and capricious, explaining that those units could not have been conveyed to
the homebuyers due to a title impediment created by the failure of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) to record a master lease for the projects where the units are located. The
court ruled that the amended version of NAHASDA governs this action because the
agency actions challenged in this suit occurred after the effective date of the 2008
amendments.
The court also found and concluded that with respect to FCAS funding for FY
2006, HUD lacked recapture authority because HUD did not “take action” within the
3-year limitation provided by 24 C.F.R. § 1000.319. It is FURTHER ORDERED that on
or before April 15, 2014, Plaintiff Nambe Pueblo Housing Entity shall submit a proposed
form of judgment, specifying the amounts to be paid to it and the asserted sources of
the payment; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff Nambe Pueblo Housing
Entity claims entitlement to payment for underfunding because HUD excluded those
units from its FCAS in a particular year, the proposed form of judgment should include a
separate itemization for those amounts, which may be submitted by May 15, 2014. The
Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and costs will be addressed after entry of judgment.
7.
Tlingit-Haida Regional Housing Authority v. United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development, No. 08–cv–00451, 2014 WL
2781728 (D. Colo. Jun 19, 2014). On March 4, 2008, Plaintiff Tlingit–Haida Regional
Housing Authority (Tlingit–Haida or Tribe) filed an action for judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., claiming that the Defendants
(collectively “HUD”) violated the Native American Housing Assistance and Self–
Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA), 25 U.S.C. § 4101 et seq., by reducing the
number of housing units counted as Formula Current Assisted Stock (FCAS) for the
calculation of the Tribe’s share of the annual Indian Housing Block Grant (IHBG) and
recapturing IHBG funds which the Tribe had received in past years for those units. This
action is governed by the version of NAHASDA that existed before it was amended by
the Native American Housing Assistance and Self–Determination Reauthorization Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110–411, 122 Stat. 4319 (2008).
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Legal issues common to this action and related actions were determined in two
previous memorandum opinions and orders in Fort Peck Housing Authority v. HUD et
al., Civil Action No. 05–cv–00018–RPM, dated August 31, 2012, and March 7, 2014.
Tlingit–Haida has established its right to an affirmative injunction requiring HUD
to restore to it the amount of $1,139,658. Final judgment was entered requiring the
Defendants to restore to Plaintiff Tlingit–Haida Regional Housing Authority the amount
of $1,139,658, for Indian Housing Block Grant funds that were illegally recaptured from
the Plaintiff for fiscal years 1998 through 2002. Any such restoration shall be in addition
to the full IHBG allocation that would otherwise be due to the Plaintiff under the Native
American Housing Assistance and Self–Determination Act (“NAHASDA”) in a given
fiscal year as calculated without application of the amount of the Judgment.
8.
Choctaw Nation of Okla. v. United States Dep’t of Housing and Urban
Dev., No. 08–cv-02577, 2014 WL 2883456 (D. Colo. 2014). On November 25, 2008,
Plaintiffs Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma and the Housing Authority of the Choctaw Nation
of Oklahoma (collectively, Choctaw or the Tribe) filed this action for judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., claiming that the Defendants
(collectively HUD) violated the Native American Housing Assistance and Self–
Determination Act of 1996 (“NAHASDA”), 25 U.S.C. § 4101 et seq., by reducing the
number of housing units counted as Formula Current Assisted Stock (FCAS) for the
calculation of the Tribe’s share of the annual Indian Housing Block Grant (IHBG) and
recapturing IHBG funds which the Tribe had received in past years.
This action is governed by the version of NAHASDA that existed before it was
amended by the Native American Housing Assistance and Self–Determination
Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–411, 122 Stat. 4319 (2008). Legal issues
common to this action and related actions were determined in two previous
memorandum opinions and orders in Fort Peck Housing Authority v. HUD et al., Civil
Action No. 05–cv–00018–RPM, dated August 31, 2012, and March 7, 2014. Choctaw
has established that it is entitled to restoration of the recaptured funds in the amount of
$841,316.00.
Defendants shall restore to Plaintiffs Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma and Housing
Authority of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma (“Plaintiff Choctaw”) the amount of
$841,316.00. Any such restoration shall be in addition to the full IHBG allocation that
would otherwise be due to Plaintiff Choctaw under the Native American Housing
Assistance and Self–Determination Act (“NAHASDA”) in a given fiscal year as
calculated without application of the amount of the Judgment.
9.
Akiachak Native Cmty. v. Jewell, No.: 06–0969, 2014 WL 2885910 __ F.
Supp. 2d __ (D.D.C. 2014). This case involved a challenge by certain Alaskan Native
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Tribes (Tribes) to a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary)
regarding taking land into trust on behalf of all Indian Tribes, 25 C.F.R. § 151.1,
pursuant to § 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 465. Pending before the
court was the State of Alaska’s (“Alaska”) Motion for a Stay and Injunction pending
appeal of the Court’s September 30, 2013 Order in the D.C. Circuit. The Court
concluded on March 31, 2013, the Alaska exception within the rule was arbitrary and
capricious and violated the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 476(g).
The case is currently on appeal in the D.C. Circuit. Meanwhile, on April 30,
2014, the Bureau of Indian Affairs published a Proposed Rule, proposing to formally
remove the Alaska exception from 25 C.F.R. § 151.1, and begin considering the
acquisition of lands into trust on behalf of Alaska Native Tribes and individuals. In this
case, Alaska filed a motion for a Stay and Injunction pending appeal. Alaska
specifically asked this Court to stay its September 30, 2013 Order and to “enjoin the
Secretary’s rulemaking activities, including accepting comments on the recently
proposed rule, and enjoin the Secretary from accepting and processing applications to
take land into trust for Alaska tribes, pending resolution of the appeal.”
The court granted Alaska’s motion for stay and injunction pending appeal in part,
denied in part, and enjoined the Secretary of the Interior from taking land into trust in
Alaska (except for the Metlakatla Indian Community of the Annette Island Reserve or its
members) until the D.C. Circuit issues a ruling and mandate resolving Alaska’s appeal.
10.
Navajo Housing Auth. v. United States Dep’t of Housing and Urban
Dev., No. 08–CV–00826, 2014 WL 2936924 (D. Colo. 2014). On April 22, 2008,
Plaintiff Navajo Housing Authority (Navajo or Tribe) filed an action for judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., claiming that the
Defendants (collectively “HUD”) violated the Native American Housing Assistance and
Self–Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA), 25 U.S.C. § 4101 et seq., by reducing the
number of housing units counted as Formula Current Assisted Stock (FCAS) for the
calculation of the Tribe’s share of the annual Indian Housing Block Grant (IHBG) and
recapturing IHBG funds which the Tribe had received in past years. Defendants shall
restore to Plaintiff Navajo Housing Authority the amount of $6,165,842 for Indian
Housing Block Grant (“IHBG”) funds that were illegally recaptured from Plaintiff Navajo.
Any such restoration shall be in addition to the full IHBG allocation that would otherwise
be due to the Plaintiff under the Native American Housing Assistance and Self–
Determination Act (NAHASDA) in a given fiscal year as calculated without application of
the amount of the Judgment.
11.
Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Tex. v. United States, No. 13-40644, 2014
WL 3360472 (5th Cir. 2014). Tribe brought suit against the United States and various
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federal agencies, alleging that issuance of drilling leases and permits on land violated
the Administrative Procedure Act and federal common law. The government moved to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The District Court, 2013 WL 1279033,
adopted the report and recommendation of Roy S. Payne, United States Magistrate
Judge, 2013 WL 1279051, and granted the motion to dismiss. Tribe appealed. The
Court of Appeals held that federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Tribe’s
claims. Affirmed.
B. Child Welfare Law And ICWA
12.
Thompson, et al. v. Fairfax Cnty. Dept. of Family Services, et. al, Nos.
2185-12-4, 2232-12-4, 2217-12-4, 2216-12-4, 2013 WL 4799747 (Va. Ct. App. 2013).
County Department of Family Services filed a petition to terminate parental rights of
both parents of an Indian child. The Circuit Court held that the guardian ad litem and
foster parents had not established good cause to retain jurisdiction and ordered the
case transferred to tribal court, but granted a stay pending appeal. The guardian ad
litem and foster parents appealed, and parents appealed an order granting stay. The
appellate court held that: (1) the appropriate standard of review was an abuse of
discretion; (2) existing Indian family exceptions would not be adopted; (3) the tribal court
had jurisdiction over both parents; (4) the best interests of the child were relevant in
considering the transfer; (5) the proceedings were not at an advanced stage; and (6) the
transfer would not cause undue hardship to parties. Reversed and remanded.
13.
In the Matter of E.G.M., No. 13–584, 2013 WL 5913807 (N.C. Ct. App.
2013). County department of social services (DSS) filed a petition alleging the child
was a neglected juvenile and was subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The
district court granted legal custody of the child to DSS, ordered child’s continued
placement with family friend, established a plan of reunification with mother, and
relieved DSS of further efforts towards reunification with father. Mother and father
appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) remand was required to provide for a
redetermination of the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over neglect proceeding
involving an Indian child; (2) the Court of Appeals could not take judicial notice of
memorandum of agreement (MOA) Indian tribe and DSS signed; (3) qualified expert
testimony which would continue custody of the Indian child, by the parent or Indian
custodian, was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child, was
to be introduced at the hearing which resulted in foster care placement of the Indian
child; and (4) as a matter of first impression, a trial court may order the cessation of
reunification efforts in Indian Child Welfare Act cases if the court finds that such efforts
would clearly be futile. Vacated and remanded.
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14.
In re Autumn K. v. Patricia M., No. A136586, 2013 WL 6092859, __ Cal.
Rptr. 3d __ (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). County Health and Social Services Department
commenced child dependency proceeding, alleging jurisdiction based on parents’
substance abuse problems, and the Indian tribe intervened. Following the termination
of reunification services, the Superior Court denied the maternal grandmother’s request
to be designated as a de facto parent, denied the mother’s request for reinstatement of
reunification services, terminated parental rights, and ordered adoption as permanent
plan. Both parents appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) grandfather’s
misdemeanor conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor was not a nonexemptable offense; (2) the Department was required by statute to evaluate the
maternal grandfather’s request for exemption to allow placement of Indian child in the
grandparents’ home; (3) the tribal custody forms, which the mother and grandmother
executed upon child’s birth, did not grant the grandmother custody over the Indian child;
and (4) the court did not improperly apply the existing Indian family doctrine. Reversed
and remanded.
15.
Dep’t of Health and Human Services v. J.G., Nos. 0400574JV4;
0900378M; A153864, 2014 WL 25206 (Or. Ct. App. 2014). Department of Human
Services moved to appoint Indian child’s current foster parent as the child’s legal
guardian. The Circuit Court granted motion. Mother appealed. The appellate court
held that: (1) as a matter of first impression, a section of the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA) allowing any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate foster care actions that
contravened ICWA was in conflict with the state appellate rule requiring the preservation
of claim of error to raise error on appeal, and therefore the ICWA section preempted
state rule; (2) durable guardianship established by trial court was a foster care
placement as could require the court to make a finding under the ICWA as to whether
active efforts had been made to prevent breakup of Indian family; but (3) in instant
action, court was not required to make an active effort finding in guardianship judgment.
Affirmed.
16.
In re Jayden D. and Dayten J., No. A-13-193, 2014 WL 116032 (Neb. Ct.
App. 2014). (From the Opinion) “Yolanda W., formerly known as Yolanda O., appeals
from the decision of the separate juvenile court of Lancaster County, which denied her
motion to transfer the termination of parental rights proceeding in this juvenile case to
tribal court. Because we find that the State failed to establish good cause to deny the
transfer, we conclude that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the motion
to transfer.”
17.
Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik Civ. 13-5020-JV, 2014 WL 317693,
2014 WL 317657 (D.S.D. 2014). Native American tribes and several tribe members
brought § 1983 action against state officials, alleging policies, practices, and procedures
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relating to the removal of Native American children from their homes during 48–hour
hearings, violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause and the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Defendants moved to dismiss. The District Court held that:
(1) Younger abstention did not apply; (2) Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine did not
deprive district court of subject matter jurisdiction; (3) tribes had parens patriae
standing; (4) allegations were sufficient to plead judge and officials were policymakers;
(5) ICWA provision provided substantive rights; (6) allegations were sufficient to state a
claim for ICWA violations; and (7) allegations were sufficient to plead denial of their
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Motions denied.
18.
In the Matter of Abbigail A., No. C074264, 2014 WL 2705177 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2014). The county department of health and human services filed dependency
petitions as to two children. The Superior Court directed counsel to make reasonable
efforts to enroll the children and their father in a tribe which had notified the court that
they were eligible for membership, concluded it was required to treat the eligible minors
as Indian children under Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), but made jurisdictional
findings and placed the children in the custody of their maternal grandmother. The
appellate court held that court rules extending ICWA protections to children merely
eligible for tribal membership are invalid. Reversed with directions.
19.
In re I.P. v. M.P., No. E060213, 226 Cal. App. 4th 1516 (Cal. Ct. App.
2014). Children and Family Services (CFS) filed a dependency petition alleging that the
child, age four, came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Indian tribe responded
indicating that the child was eligible for membership and that the tribe was intervening.
The Superior Court found that the child was adoptable and terminated parental rights,
and also found, inter alia, that CFS had complied “with the noticing requirements” of the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Mother appealed. The appellate court held that the
mother failed to show a reasonable probability that compliance with the procedural
requirements of tribal customary adoption would have resulted in an outcome more
favorable to her. Affirmed.
20.
In re Interest of Mischa S., No. A–13–265, 22 Neb. App. 105, __ N.W.
2d __ (Neb. Ct. App. 2014). State filed a petition to have a child adjudicated as lacking
proper parental care. Parents, one of whom was member of Indian tribe, entered a no
contest admission to petition, and the child was allowed to remain at home, under
supervision. Guardian ad litem (GAL) subsequently moved to remove child from home.
Following a hearing, the County Court ordered the child to be placed in foster care and
declared a provision of the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) unconstitutional.
Parents appealed.
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The appellate court held that: (1) there was not clear and convincing expert
evidence that serious emotional damage would result if child, who became subject of
original adjudication petition because of excessive school absences, were not removed
from parents’ home, as required for foster care placement under Nebraska Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA); (2) juvenile court’s sua sponte determination, that provision of
Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was unconstitutional as applied, was void;
and (3) in proceedings under the Nebraska ICWA for foster placement of, or termination
of parental rights to, an Indian child, proof by a preponderance of the evidence is the
standard for satisfying the court of active efforts to prevent the breakup of Indian family.
Reversed and remanded.
21.
In re Alexandria P., No. B252999, 2014 WL 4053054, __ Cal. Rptr. 3d __
(Cal. Ct. App. 2014). (From the opinion.) This case involved the placement
preferences set forth in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).
At issue is whether the dependency court properly applied the ICWA in finding that the
foster parents of an Indian child failed to prove good cause to deviate from the ICWA’s
adoptive placement preferences. A 17-month–old Indian child was removed from the
custody of her mother, who has a lengthy substance abuse problem and has lost
custody of at least six other children, and her father, who has an extensive criminal
history and has lost custody of one other child. The girl’s father is an enrolled member
of an Indian tribe, and the girl is considered an Indian child under the ICWA. The tribe
consented to the girl’s placement with a non-Indian foster family to facilitate efforts to
reunify the girl with her father. The girl lived in two foster homes before she was placed
with de facto parents at the age of two. She bonded with the family and has thrived for
the past two and a half years. After reunification efforts failed, the father, the tribe, and
the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) recommended that the
girl be placed in Utah with a non-Indian couple who were extended family of the father.
De facto parents argued good cause existed to depart from the ICWA’s adoptive
placement preferences and it was in the girl’s best interests to remain with de facto
family. The child’s court-appointed counsel argued that good cause did not exist.
The court ordered the girl placed with the extended family in Utah after finding
that the de facto parents had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that it was a
certainty the child would suffer emotional harm by the transfer. De facto parents also
contend that the ICWA’s adoptive placement preferences do not apply when the tribe
has consented to a child’s placement outside of the ICWA’s foster care placement
preferences. The court disagreed with their interpretation of the statutory language. De
facto parents further contend that the court erroneously applied the clear and convincing
standard of proof, rather than a preponderance of the evidence, a contention we reject
based upon the overwhelming authority on the issue.
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Finally, the de facto parents contend that the court erroneously interpreted the
"good cause" exception to the ICWA’s adoptive placement preferences as requiring
proof of a certainty that the child would suffer emotional harm if placed with the Utah
couple, and failed to consider the bond between Alexandria and her foster family, the
risk of detriment if that bond was broken, and Alexandria’s best interests. The court
agreed with this last contention and reversed the placement order because the court’s
error was prejudicial. The order transferring custody of the minor to the R.s was
reversed. The cause was remanded to determine if good cause existed to deviate from
the ICWA’s adoptive placement preferences.
22.
In re Candace A., No. S–15251, 2014 WL 4160043, __ P.3d __ (Alaska
2014). The superior court adjudicated Candace, a child in need of aid, because she
had been sexually abused by her adoptive brother. The Superior Court nonetheless
ordered that Candace be returned to her parents' home, holding that the Department of
Health and Social Services, Office of Children's Services (OCS), had failed to present
“qualified expert testimony” as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to
support a finding that she would likely suffer serious physical or emotional harm in her
parents' custody. The Superior Court held an adjudication hearing to determine
whether Candace was a child in need of aid and whether removal from her family home
could be justified. OCS called Barbara Cosolito to provide the expert testimony. ICWA
was required to show “that the continued custody of the child by the parent . . . is likely
to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” The Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) had defined the ICWA phrase “qualified expert witnesses” to include lay
persons with “substantial experience and knowledge regarding relevant Indian social
and cultural standards” and “professional persons” who have “substantial education in
the area of [their] specialty.” It was against these BIA standards that the Superior Court
judged the qualifications of OCS's proposed experts. Social work in Alaska has all the
earmarks of a profession. The law requires a state license for the practice of social
work. A licensed clinical social worker must have a master's or doctoral degree in social
work, must have completed at least two years of continuous full-time employment in
post-graduate clinical social work, must have good moral character and be “in good
professional standing,” must provide “three professional references” acceptable to the
licensing board, and must pass the licensing examination. Social workers are subject to
a code of ethics, including confidentiality requirements, and must maintain their licenses
by continuing education courses, including “professional ethics.” Social workers who do
not conform to “minimum professional standards” are subject to discipline. Alaska
statutes and rules reflect a common understanding that social workers are
professionals. And in our case law, we have strongly implied that social workers may
be qualified experts under the third BIA guideline as long as they have “expertise
beyond the normal social worker qualifications.”
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The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's rulings on whether OCS's two
proffered witnesses were qualified experts for purposes of 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e); vacated
the portion of the adjudication order placing Candace with her parents; and remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.	
  
C. Contracting
23.
Healy Lake Village v. Mt. McKinley Bank, No. S–14987, 2014 WL
1408554, __ P.3d __ (Alaska 2014). Tribal members who claimed to constitute newly
elected tribal councilmen brought a declaratory judgment action against a bank to
determine who was authorized to act on behalf of the tribe and to access the tribe's
accounts. A second group of tribal members who claimed to represent the tribe based
on a competing election was granted intervention to challenge the Superior Court's
jurisdiction. The Superior Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the members who
brought the initial action appealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1) the Superior
Court did not commit reversible error by failing to convert bank's motion to dismiss to a
motion for summary judgment; (2) any inquiry into the legitimacy of competing tribal
elections was solely within tribe's retained inherent sovereignty; and (3) the Superior
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over tribal member's declaratory judgment
action against bank. Affirmed.
D. Employment
24.
South v. Lujan, No. 32,015, 2014 WL 3908038, __ P.3d __ (N.M. Ct.
App. 2014). Plaintiff-Appellant Tiffany South. a former officer with the Sandia Pueblo
Police Department, (Plaintiff) filed a complaint for violation of the New Mexico Human
Rights Act (NMHRA), retaliatory discharge, and tortious inference with contract against
Defendants-Appellees Isaac Lujan, William Duran, and Mary–Alice Brogdon
(collectively, Defendants) in their individual capacities. The district court granted
Appellees’ motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff, who had been an
officer with the Sandia Pueblo Police Department (the Department), alleged that
Defendants Lujan and Duran, the Chief and Captain of the Department, respectively,
had sexually harassed her and that, together with Defendant Brogdon, the employee
relations manager for Sandia Pueblo, had retaliated against her after she complained of
the sexual harassment. She also maintained that the Defendants interfered with her
employment contract with Sandia Pueblo “with the explicit motive of terminating [her
employment] for false reasons[.]”
Plaintiff is not Indian. Defendant Lujan is Indian and a member of the Pueblo.
Defendants Duran and Brogdon are neither Indian nor members of the Pueblo. Sandia
Pueblo is not named as a party in the complaint. Defendants moved for dismissal of the
complaint, arguing that the NMHRA did not apply to the Pueblo and its employees and
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that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the Pueblo’s sovereign immunity and, therefore,
the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the complaint. They also argued that the
suit must be dismissed because the Pueblo is a necessary party to the suit, which
cannot be joined. After a hearing, the District Court granted the Defendants’ motion and
dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed.
The overarching question presented- does the state court have subject matter
jurisdiction over these claims?-depended on the answers to a number of components:
including whether the conduct complained of occurred on the reservation, whether the
conduct complained of occurred within the scope of employment, whether the Pueblo is
a necessary party, and to what extent the Pueblo has sought to regulate disputes
between its employees when employees are sued in tort in their individual capacities.
Here, there are two important issues that are inadequately developed for review.
The first is whether the Defendants’ alleged conduct occurred within the scope of
employment by the Pueblo. The second issue is whether state court jurisdiction would
infringe on the Pueblo’s sovereignty under the facts of this case. Being no factual basis
for the District Court’s ruling in the record, the Court reversed and remanded the case to
the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
E. Environmental Regulations
25.
Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis. v. Village of Hobart, Wis., No. 12 3419,
2013 WL 5692337 (7th Cir. 2013). An Indian tribe filed action seeking a declaratory
judgment that the village lacked authority to impose charges under its storm water
management utility ordinance on parcels of land held in trust by the United States for
the tribe located on reservation and within village. The tribe also sought injunctive relief
enjoining the village from attempting to enforce its ordinance upon tribal lands. The
tribe filed motion for summary judgment. The United States filed a motion for summary
judgment on village's third-party complaint against the United States, alleging that the
United States, as holder of the bare title to the tribal trust lands, had to pay the storm
water fees if the tribe was not responsible for doing so. The District Court, 891 F. Supp.
2d 1058, granted motions. Village appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) the
Clean Water Act (CWA) did not authorize village to impose storm water management
charges upon property held in trust for the benefit of Indian tribe; (2) the village's storm
water management charges constituted an impermissible tax upon tribal trust property;
and (3) the United States was not obligated to pay storm water management taxes
imposed by village upon tribal lands. Affirmed.
26.
Okla. Dept. of Envtl. Quality v. E.P.A., No. 11–1307, 740 F.3d 185
(D.D.C. 2014). Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality petitioned for review of
final rule promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean
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Air Act (CAA), which established a federal implementation plan for the attainment of
national air quality standards in Indian country. The Appellate Court held that:
(1) Oklahoma had standing to bring petition; (2) Oklahoma’s petition was not timebarred; (3) Oklahoma did not forfeit its claim that state implementation plan
presumptively applied in non-reservation Indian country; and (4) EPA had no authority
under the CAA to issue the rule. Petition granted.
27.
HonoluluTraffic.com v. Federal Transit Admin., No. 13–15277, 2014
WL 607320, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. 2014). Consortium of interest groups and individuals
opposing high-speed rail project filed action against Federal Transit Administration
(FTA), Department of Transportation (DOT), municipality, and various federal and local
administrators asserting challenges under National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), and Department of Transportation Act. The
District Court, 2012 WL 5386595, entered summary judgment in the defendants’ favor
on most claims, but enjoined construction of the project’s fourth phase pending remand
to agency. Plaintiffs appealed. The Appellate Court held that: (1) district court’s order
was final reviewable decision; (2) statement of purpose in project’s final environmental
impact statement (FEIS) did not unreasonably restrict project’s purpose and need;
(3) FEIS adequately considered alternatives; (4) FTA’s finding that managed lanes
alternative (MLA) and bus rapid transit alternatives were not prudent was not arbitrary or
capricious; and (5) FTA and city were not required to complete their identification and
evaluation of Native Hawaiian burial sites before approving project. Affirmed.
28.
Public Employees for Envtl. Responsibility v. Beaudreu, Nos.
10-1067, 10-1073, 10-1079, and 10-1238, 2014 WL 985394, __ F. Supp. 2d __ (D.D.C.
2014).
In consolidated cases, individuals and environmental groups brought
interrelated claims concerning several administrative decisions made by federal
agencies approving construction of various aspects of offshore wind energy project in
Nantucket Sound. Wind energy contractor intervened, and parties moved and crossmoved for summary judgment. The District Court held that: (1) Coast Guard’s terms
and conditions for project were reasonable under Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Act of 2006; (2) United States Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
(BOEM) did not violate Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act; (3) Endangered Species Act
(ESA) required United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to independently make
determination to discard operational adjustment; (4) biological opinion of National
Marine and Fisheries Service (NMFS) was not arbitrary and capricious; (5) NMFS
violated ESA by failing to include incidental take statement concerning North Atlantic
right whales in its biological opinion; (6) NMFS appropriately considered project’s
potential impact on listed sea turtles; (7) Migratory Bird Treaty Act did not require BOEM
to obtain FWS permit to take migratory birds prior to approving project; (8) BOEM
appropriately conducted consultation process under National Historic Preservation Act;
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(9) BOEM’s final environmental impact state (EIS) was not arbitrary and capricious; and
(10) BOEM was not required to prepare new or supplemental EIS. Motions granted in
part and denied in part.
29.
Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone Indians of Nevada v. U.S. Dept.
of the Interior, No. 12-15412, 2014 WL 1244275 (9th Cir. 2014). Indian tribes brought
action challenging Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) approval of mining project on
federal land, alleging violations of Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)
and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Project owner intervened. The District
Court, 2012 WL 13780, granted summary judgment in favor of BLM and project owner.
Tribes appealed. The Appellate Court held that: (1) BLM did not act arbitrarily or
capriciously when it determined further accommodation of Indian tribes’ religious use of
pediment area of piñon-juniper groves at base of mountain in project area was not
practicable, and (2) BLM did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in analyzing project’s
impacts on water resources. Affirmed.
30.
El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United States, Nos. 12–5156, 12–5157,
2014 WL 1328164 (D.D.C. 2014). The natural gas company brought action against the
United States and other federal entities, alleging failure to fulfill obligations under
Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA), Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), and Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in connection with
certain properties alleged to be contaminated with residual radioactive waste. The
Indian tribe intervened, asserting claims under UMTRCA and federal and tribal law.
Defendants moved to dismiss. The District Court, 774 F. Supp. 2d 40 and 847 F. Supp.
2d 111, granted motions. Defendants appealed. The Appellate Court held that:
(1) Comprehensive Environmental Resources, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) barred court’s jurisdiction over RCRA claims related to landfill site;
(2) dismissal of RCRA claims under CERCLA should have been without prejudice;
(3) tribe’s RCRA claims in relation to other site were not moot; (4) as matter of first
impression, governmental agencies are persons entitled to bring citizen suits under
RCRA; (5) UMTRCA did not preclude judicial review of tribe’s APA claims; (6) tribe
failed to state “failure to act” claims under APA; and (7) tribe did not have cause of
action against United States for breach of trust duties. Affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded.
31.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakama Nation v. U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Serv., No. 1:14–CV–3052, 2014 WL 1778391, __ F. Supp. 2d __ (E.D. Wash.
2014). Before the court was plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order. This
case concerns guided bus tours for members of the general public on Rattlesnake
Mountain in the Hanford Reach National Monument conducted by Defendant United
States Fish and Wildlife Services (“USFWS”). Plaintiff Confederated Tribes and Bands
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of the Yakama Nation (“the Yakama Nation”) sought judicial review of the USFWS’s
agency decision and actions that the guided tours will have no adverse effect on the
site, which has been designated a Traditional Cultural Property (TCP) under the
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). Rattlesnake Mountain, overlooking the
Hanford Site in Benton County, Washington, is known to the Yakama Nation as Laliik,
and means “standing above the water.”
Laliik has cosmological, religious, and cultural significance for the Yakama Nation
and other Indian tribes. The Yakama Nation ceded the land on which Laliik is situated
to the United States under the Treaty of 1855. In 2007, Laliik was designated as a
Traditional Cultural Property (TCP) pursuant to § 101(d)(6)(A) of the NHPA. A TCP is a
“property of traditional religious and cultural importance to an Indian tribe” and is
thereby eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places. USFWS issued a
finding that the wildflower tours presented “no adverse effect” on the Laliik TCP. State
Historic Preservation Officer Allyson Brooks notified the USFWS that she did not concur
with the finding of no adverse effect. USFWS informed the Tribe that it would have the
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation review the new proposal because the Tribe
and the State Historical Preservation Office had not concurred with the USFWS. The
Tribe told the ACHP that it did not concur with the new tours proposal. The ACHP
recommended to USFWS that it consult further with the Tribe prior to any further
wildflower tours on the Laliik TCP, citing the allegedly unfollowed work controls and the
Tribe’s belief that there was an adverse effect. The Yakama Nation was told that the
USFWS had made a final agency decision to proceed with eight wildflower tours and
then filed its complaint. After the first two days of tours occurred, the Tribe moved the
Court for a temporary restraining order prohibiting the tours scheduled for May 8 and
10, 2014.
The Court found that the record before the Court does not support the issuance
of such a “drastic remedy” as a TRO provides and denied Plaintiff’s Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order.
32.
WaterLegacy Advocacy v. U.S. E.P.A., No. 13–1323, 2014 WL 2462852
(D. Minn. 2014). Non-profit environmental organizations and Indian tribes brought
action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief pursuant to the Clean Water Act
(CWA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), challenging Environmental
Protection Agency’s (EPA) approval of a water quality standards variance for a
commercial-scale iron nugget production facility. EPA filed unopposed motion to vacate
its approval of variance and remand the matter to the agency for further consideration,
and facility owner moved to intervene. The District Court held that: (1) facility owner
was not required to specify whether it sought intervention as a plaintiff or defendant in
motion to intervene; (2) intervention motion was not moot; (3) timeliness factors

	
  

469

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL

Volume III, Issue II - Spring 2015

	
  
weighed in favor of intervention of facility owner; and (4) district court would not vacate
EPA’s approval of variance on remand to agency for further consideration. Motions
granted.
33.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, et al. v. Dep’t Of Environmental Quality, No.
307602, 2014 WL 3928563, __ N.W. 2d __ (Mich. Ct. App. 2014). Appellants appealed
by leave granted from the circuit court’s order affirming the decision of the Department
of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to grant a mining permit to the Kennecott Eagle
Minerals Company. At issue is appellee Kennecott Eagle’s proposal to develop an
underground mine to extract nickel and copper from the sulfide ores beneath the
headwaters of the Salmon Trout River. The Keweenaw Bay Indian Community
intervened in this case over its concerns over the impacts of mining operations on the
cultural traditions associated with Eagle Rock.
Appellees objected to further
development of this issue below on the ground that appellants had stipulated to limit
such advocacy to the issue of the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community’s standing to
intervene. The ALJ, however, reached the issue on its merits, and determined that
further findings were in order. The DEQ’s final decision-maker, however, alternatively
concluded that a stipulation kept the issue off the table, and that “place of worship” for
purposes of Rule 425.202(2)(p) referred to buildings for human occupancy, not purely
outdoor locations. The circuit court in turn affirmed the DEQ on those alternative
grounds.
The court affirmed on still other grounds. Kennecott submitted its EIA in
February 2006, and public hearings on the mining application were held in September
of that year. In their brief on appeal, appellants advise that Kennecott and the DEQ
“were informed of the significance of Eagle Rock during the Part 632 public comment
period,” thus admitting that Kennecott had no knowledge of any such customs when it
submitted its EIA. Appellants nowhere suggest that any investigation or inquiry on
Kennecott’s part in those early stages of the proceedings was deficient, nor do they cite
any authority for the proposition that a mining applicant is obliged to update its EIA
throughout the whole review process to take account of newly acquired information.
Accordingly, assuming without deciding that no stipulation prevented litigation of this
issue, and also that “places of worship” for purposes of Rule 425.202(2)(p) include such
outdoor locations as Eagle Rock, we nonetheless hold that Kennecott Eagle’s EIA was
not deficient for want of consideration of Eagle Rock as a place of worship, because it
neither knew, nor should have known, of such traditional cultural uses of that location
when it offered its EIA. For the reasons stated, we affirm the decision of the circuit court
affirming the DEQ’s decision to grant Kennecott Eagle a Part 632 mining permit.
Affirmed.
F. Fisheries, Water, FERC, BOR
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34.
Squaxin Island Tribe v. Wash. State Dept. of Ecology, No. 42710–9–II,
312 P.3d 766 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2013). Indian tribe sought review of Department
of Ecology’s denial of its rulemaking petition, which sought amendments to watershed
management rules to protect minimum instream flows of creek. The Superior Court
found that denial of petition was arbitrary and capricious. Department appealed. The
appellate court held that: (1) Department’s written denial of tribe’s rulemaking petition
satisfied statute that required agency to provide reasons for rejecting a rulemaking
request, and (2) decision to deny tribe’s rulemaking petition was not arbitrary and
capricious. Reversed.
35.
U.S. v. Brown; U.S. v. Jerry A. Reyes, a/k/a Otto Reyes, Marc L.
Lyons, and Frederick W. Tibbetts, a/k/a Bud Tibbetts, Nos. 13–68 and 13–70, 2013
WL 6175202 (D. Minn. 2013). Defendants Michael Brown, Jerry Reyes, Marc Lyons,
and Frederick Tibbetts were indicted for violating the Lacey Act by transporting and
selling fish in violation of tribal law. 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a).1 Defendants moved to
dismiss their respective indictments on the grounds that, as members of the Leech Lake
and White Earth bands of Chippewa Indians, their right to fish on the Leech Lake
Reservation is protected by the 1837 Treaty with the Chippewa, 7 Stat. 536, July 29,
1837, such that the federal prosecution violated their treaty rights. U.S. Magistrate
Judge Brisbois issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) in each case,
recommending that the Court deny Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Defendants
objected to the R&Rs. The Court sustained the objections. The Court dismissed
Defendants’ indictments because the 1837 Treaty protects Defendants’ right to fish on
the reservation and Congress has not specifically abrogated that right.
36.
Kickapoo Tribe of Indians of Kickapoo Reservation in Kansas v.
Black, No. 06-2248, 2013 WL 6796423 (D. Kan. 2013). Before the court were cross
motions for summary judgment filed by defendant Nemaha Brown Watershed Joint
District No. 7 and plaintiff Kickapoo Tribe of Indians of the Kickapoo Reservation in
Kansas. The Tribe and the District entered into the Watershed Plan and Environmental
Impact Statement for the Upper Delaware and Tributaries Watershed (Agreement) in
1994 to serve as co-sponsors of a project aimed to carry out works of improvement for
soil conservation and for other purposes, including flood prevention. The parties agreed
to co-sponsor the project after failed attempts by each party to sponsor the project on its
own. In addition to twenty floodwater retarding dams and other various improvements,
the Agreement included plans for a multipurpose dam with recreational facilities,
otherwise known as the “Plum Creek Project.” The Tribe asked the District multiple
times to exercise its power of eminent domain to condemn non-Indian-owned land for
the Plum Creek Project that the Tribe had been unable to acquire on its own. The
District declined the Tribe’s request each time. In essence, the Tribe claimed that the
Agreement is a binding contract that obligates the District to condemn 1,200 acres of
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land on the Tribe’s behalf to build the Plum Creek Project. The court granted summary
judgment in the District’s favor and against the Tribe based on its determination as a
matter of law that the Agreement does not obligate the District to condemn on the
Tribe’s behalf.
37.
Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Goldmark, No. C13–5071, 2014 WL 119022,
__ F. Supp. 2d __ (W.D. Wash. 2014). An Indian tribe brought action against
government officials, seeking to protect the privilege of hunting and gathering roots and
berries on open and unclaimed lands, guaranteed by Treaty. Defendants moved to
dismiss. The District Court held that: (1) Indian tribe established a cognizable injury for
purposes of Article III standing; (2) Eleventh Amendment did not bar Indian tribe's
claims against county prosecutors; (3) Eleventh Amendment did not bar Indian tribe's
claims against Director of Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW) and
Chief of WDFW Enforcement; (4) Eleventh Amendment did not bar Indian tribe's claims
against Washington State Attorney General; (5) Eleventh Amendment barred Indian
tribe's claims against the Washington State Commissioner of Public Lands and
Administrator for the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and the Supervisor for
DNR; (6) other signatory Indian tribes to Treaty were necessary parties; and
(7) prejudice to other signatory Indian tribes to Treaty, who were necessary parties and
who could not be joined due to their sovereign immunity, warranted dismissal. Motion
granted.
38.
U.S. v. Lummi Nation, No. 12–35936, 2014 WL 4067168, __ F.3d __ (9th
Cir. 2014). In proceedings to adjudicate fishing rights reserved by 1855 Treaty of Point
Elliott, Lower Elwha Band of S’Klallams, Jamestown Band of S’Klallams, Port Gamble
Band of S’Klallams, and Skokomish Indian Tribe sought determination that the Lummi
Indian Tribe was violating 1974 District Court opinion in United States v. Washington by
fishing in areas outside its adjudicated usual and accustomed grounds and stations.
The District Court dismissed the action following the entry of summary judgment order
in 1990 in favor of plaintiff tribes, determining that the 1974 opinion did not intend to
include disputed areas within Lummi tribe’s usual and accustomed grounds and
stations. Plaintiff tribes appealed. The Appellate Court, 235 F.3d 443, affirmed in part
and reversed in part. On remand, the District Court, 2012 WL 4846239, entered
summary judgment on Klallam tribes’ request for determination that Lummi tribe’s usual
and accustomed grounds did not include eastern portion of Strait of Juan de Fuca or
waters west of Whidbey Island. Lummi tribe appealed. The Appellate Court held that
law of the case doctrine did not control determination of Lummi tribe’s usual and
accustomed grounds. Reversed and remanded.
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G. Gaming
39.
State ex rel. Dewberry v. Kitzhaber, No. A146366, 2013 WL 6022097,
__ P.3d __ (Or. Ct. App. 2013). Residents near site of proposed casino brought action
as relators for a writ of mandamus, challenging the Governor’s authority to enter into a
gaming compact with tribes under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). The
Circuit Court dismissed the petition, and residents appealed. The Appellate Court, 187
P.3d 220, reversed and remanded, and the State appealed. The Supreme Court, 346
Or. 260, 210 P.3d 884, affirmed and remanded. On remand, the Circuit Court entered
summary judgment in favor of Governor and tribes. Property owners appealed. The
Appellate Court held that: (1) State statute governing agreements by the state and local
governments with American Indian tribes conferred authority on Governor to enter into
gaming compact with Indian tribes under IGRA; (2) the state constitutional ban on the
operation of casinos in the state does not apply on Indian lands located within state’s
borders; and (3) the statute authorizing the Governor to enter into gaming compact with
Indian tribes did not improperly delegate legislative functions to the Governor in violation
of separation of powers doctrine. Affirmed.
40.
Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, Nos. 10–17803, 10–17878, 2014 WL
211763 (9th Cir. 2014). An Indian tribe brought action alleging that the State violated
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) by failing to negotiate in good faith for a
casino on a particular 11-acre parcel of land. The District Court granted summary
judgment for the tribe, 759 F. Supp. 2d 1149, but, subsequently, granted the State’s
motion for a stay pending appeal, 2012 WL 298464. Both parties appealed. The
Appellate Court held that: (1) the tribe’s right to request negotiations under the IGRA
depends on it having jurisdiction over Indian lands on which it proposed to conduct
gaming; (2) the State could waive the IGRA’s “Indian lands” requirement; (3) the State’s
challenge to entrustment of 11-acre parcel of land to tribe was timely; and (4) the
11-acre parcel of land did not constitute “Indian lands” over which tribe could demand
negotiations. Reversed and remanded.
41.
Friends of Amador County v. Salazar, No. 11–17996, 2014 WL 308560
(9th Cir. 2014). An advocacy organization and its members brought action against the
State of California and its Governor, the Department of the Interior (DOI) and its
Secretary, and the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) and its Acting
Chairman, challenging the state’s gaming compact with an Indian Tribe, and the federal
recognition of the Tribe. The Indian tribe intervened. The District Court, 2011 WL
4709883, granted the Tribe’s motion to dismiss, and denied a motion to vacate the
dismissal, 2011 WL 6141291. The advocacy organization and its members appealed.
The Appellate Court held that: (1) the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the Indian Tribe was a required party; (2) the District Court did not
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abuse its discretion in determining that it would not be feasible to join the Indian Tribe;
(3) the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Indian Tribe was
an indispensable party; and (4) the public rights exception to joinder did not apply.
Affirmed.
42.
Catawba Indian Nation v. State, No. 2012–212118, 2014 WL 1307180,
__ S.E. 2d __ (S.C. 2014). An Indian tribe brought a declaratory judgment action
against the state to determine the effect of Gambling Cruise Act on its gambling rights.
The Circuit Court granted state summary judgment. Tribe appealed. The Supreme
Court held that: (1) declaratory judgment action was not precluded by doctrine of
collateral estoppel; (2) action was not precluded by doctrine of res judicata; but (3) Act
did not authorize tribe to offer video poker on its reservation. Affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
43.
Alabama v. PCI Gaming Authority, No. 2:13–CV–178, 2014 WL
1400232 (M.D. Ala. 2014). (From the opinion.) The State of Alabama brought an equity
action under state-nuisance law and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2721, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168, to prevent allegedly unlawful gaming at three
Indian-run casinos in Alabama: Creek Casino in Elmore County; Wind Creek Casino in
Escambia County; and Creek Casino in Montgomery County. Defendants are PCI
Gaming Authority, the commercial entity through which the Poarch Band of Creek
Indians ("Poarch Band") operates the casinos, and members of PCI Gaming Authority
and of the Poarch Band Tribal Council in their official capacities. After careful
consideration of the arguments of counsel, the pertinent law, and the pleadings, as
supplemented by the undisputed evidence, the court found that the Defendants' motion
to dismiss was due to be granted.	
  
H. Jurisdiction, Federal
44.
U.S. v. Zepeda, No. 10-10131, __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 5273093, (9th Cir.
2013). On October 25, 2008, Damien Zepeda was charged with conspiracy to commit
assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and use of a firearm during a crime of violence.
The indictment alleged that Zepeda was an “Indian [ ].” Following a jury trial, Zepeda
was convicted of all counts. Zepeda’s appeal called upon the court to decide whether a
Certificate of Enrollment in an Indian tribe, entered into evidence through the parties’
stipulation, was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was an Indian for the purposes of § 1153 where the government
offers no evidence that the defendant’s bloodline is derived from a federally recognized
tribe. At Zepeda’s trial, the government introduced into evidence a document entitled
“Gila River Enrollment/Census Office Certified Degree of Indian Blood.” The document
bore an “official seal” and stated that Zepeda was “an enrolled member of the Gila River
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Indian Community,” and that “information [wa]s taken from the official records and
membership roll of the Gila River Indian Community.” It also stated that Zepeda had a
“Blood Degree” of “1/4 Pima [and] 1/4 Tohono O’Odham” for a total of 1/2. The
prosecutor and Zepeda’s attorney stipulated to admission of the Certificate into
evidence without objection. On appeal, Zepeda argued inter alia, that the government
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was an Indian under § 1153.
The Appellate Court held that the Tribal Enrollment Certificate was insufficient to
establish that Zepeda was an Indian for the purposes of federal jurisdiction under §
1153 because the government introduced no evidence that Zepeda’s bloodline was
derived from a federally recognized tribe. The court reversed Zepeda’s convictions
under § 1153, in counts 2 through 9 of the indictment. Zepeda’s conviction for
conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 was unaffected by this disposition. Reversed
in part and remanded for resentencing.
45.
Trazell v. Wilmers, No. 12–01369, 2013 WL 5593042 (D.D.C. 2013). Car
owner, a member of the Cherokee-Choctaw nation, brought action against bank, its
director, and bank employee, alleging that the defendants repossessed his vehicle in
violation of Treaty of Watertown, Fourth and Fifth Amendments, several of his statutory
rights, international resolutions, and District of Columbia Municipal Regulations. The
defendants moved to dismiss and the owner moved for summary judgment. The District
Court held that: (1) owner's complaint failed to state claim for violation of Treaty of
Watertown; (2) the complaint failed to state claim for violation of Fourth Amendment,
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and section 1983; (3) the complaint failed to
state claim for violation of statute providing protection to foreign officials, official guests,
and internationally protected persons from physical attack or imprisonment; (4) the
complaint failed to state claim for violation of statue governing loans by a bank on its
own stock; (5) the complaint stated claim for violation of municipal regulation requiring
holder to retain or store repossessed vehicle for 15 days; and (6) the genuine dispute of
material fact existed as to whether defendants had valid security interest in owner's
vehicle. Defendants' motion was granted in part, denied in part and the owner's motion
denied.
46.
Brenner v. Bendigo, No. CIV 13–0005, 2013 WL 5652457 (D.S.D. 2013).
Plaintiff Michelle Brenner (Brenner) filed an Affidavit for Garnishment (Affidavit) seeking
to enforce a tribal court judgment in Federal District Court pursuant to a state
garnishment statute. Garnishees Beau Bendigo, Larry Bendigo, and Bendigo Ranch
filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that this Court lacks subject matter and personal
jurisdiction to enforce the tribal court judgment, that the Affidavit failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, and that Brenner had not complied with South Dakota
Codified Law (SDCL) 21–18–9. Brenner brought a wrongful death action against Cody
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Bendigo in Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court. In an Order on Damages dated
December 20, 2006, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court awarded Brenner a
$3,000,000.00 judgment against Cody Bendigo. It does not appear that Brenner has
sought first to enforce this judgment in the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court before
attempting the collection proceeding before this Court. Beau Bendigo is an enrolled
member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe who lives with his father, Larry Bendigo, on
tribal trust land within the boundaries of the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation. Beau
Bendigo's ranch, called Bendigo Ranch, and ranching equipment are on tribal trust land
that he leases from the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and the United States Bureau of
Indian Affairs and sit within the confines of the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation.
Thus, it appears that all the property that Brenner seeks to execute upon is either tribal
trust land held in trust by the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe or assets located on tribal trust property within the Cheyenne River Indian
Reservation. The court granted the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and dismissed the
plaintiff’s Affidavit for Garnishment.
47.
Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation,
No. 13-00123, 2013 WL 5954391 (D. Utah 2013). This matter was before the court on
defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6). Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff Becker’s amended complaint, which
stated three causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing; and (3) accounting. Becker’s claims arose from a dispute over an
agreement he entered into with one or more of the defendants. Because plaintiff’s
complaint did not, on its face, plead causes of action created by federal law, and
because the plaintiff’s causes of action did not include, as an essential element, any
right or immunity created by federal law, the court concluded that plaintiff’s claims did
not meet the “arising under” standard for federal-question jurisdiction and that the court
was without jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, the court granted
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed
plaintiff’s amended complaint.
48.
F.T.C. v. AMG Services, Inc., No. 2:12–CV–00536, 2014 WL 910302 (D.
Nev. 2014).
Pending before the court for consideration was the Report and
Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. The FTC filed its Complaint alleging that
defendants had violated portions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) 15
U.S.C. §§ 41–58; the Truth /in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f; and the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r. These violations were
alleged to have occurred in connection with the defendants’ activities in offering and
extending “high-fee, short-term ‘payday’ loans and the collection of those loans.” The
FTC’s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment and the defendants’ Motions for Legal
Determination were referred to the Magistrate Judge.
The Magistrate Judge
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recommended an order granting in part and denying in part the FTC’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and granting in part and denying in part the Tribal Chartered
Defendants’ Motion for Legal Determination and defendant Little Axe’s Cross–Motion for
Legal Determination. Defendant Little Axe filed an Objection in which he argues that
the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that the FTC does have authority under the FTC
Act to regulate Indian tribes, arms of Indian tribes, employees of arms of Indian tribes,
and contractors of arms of Indian tribes and in failing to apply Indian law canons and
certain Supreme Court opinions that defendant LittleAxe asserted are controlling on this
issue. The Tribal Chartered defendants filed an Objection in which they argued that the
Magistrate Judge erred in his conclusion that (1) the defendants bear the burden of
proving whether the FTC Act applies to the Tribal Chartered Defendants and that (2) the
FTC has authority under the FTC Act to regulate Indian tribes, arms of Indian tribes,
employees of arms of Indian tribes, and contractors of arms of Indian tribes. The court
found that the Magistrate Judge correctly found that the FTC Act is a federal statute of
general applicability that under controlling Ninth Circuit precedent grants the FTC
authority to regulate arms of Indian tribes, their employees, and their contractors. The
court accepted and adopted in full, to the extent it is not inconsistent with this opinion
the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendations.
49.
Tavares, et al. v. Whitehouse, et al., No. 2:13–cv–02101, 2014 WL
1155798 (E.D. Cal. 2014). This matter was before the Court on Respondents’ Motion to
Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners are members of the United Auburn Indian
Community (“Tribe”). Petitioners challenged punishment imposed on them by the Tribal
Council of the United Auburn Indian Community. Respondents, members of the Tribal
Council, sought dismissal, arguing the case concerned internal tribal matters, and
therefore the Court lacked jurisdiction. Petitioners opposed dismissal arguing their
petition was within the Court’s jurisdiction under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
(“ICRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 1303, because their exclusion from tribal lands and suspension of
per capita gaming benefits. Although temporary, it still constituted “detention” within the
meaning of the statute. This case arose from a dispute over tribal management.
Petitioners initiated an unsuccessful recall campaign attempting to remove
Respondents, members of the Tribal Council, from office. Afterward, the Tribal Council
determined Petitioners had violated a Tribal ordinance prohibiting defamation.
Petitioners alleged their punishment was imposed in retaliation for the recall campaign.
Petitioners argued their punishment constituted banishment, invoking this Court’s ICRA
habeas jurisdiction. The Court analyzed the issue raised by Respondents’ motion:
whether Petitioners’ punishment was so severe a restraint on liberty it constituted
“detention” sufficient to invoke the Court’s federal habeas corpus jurisdiction under
ICRA. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under the Indian Civil Rights Act was
dismissed.
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50.
Hawkins v. Attatayuk, No. S–14812, 2014 WL 1408563, __ P.3d __
(Alaska 2014). Former wife brought trespass action against former husband. The
Superior Court entered judgment in favor of former wife. Former husband appealed.
The Supreme Court held that Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate title to Alaska Native townsite property allegedly owned by former wife.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
51.
E.E.O.C. v. Forest County Potawatomi Community, No. 13–MC–61,
2014 WL 1795137 (E.D. Wis. 2014). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
filed this action to enforce a subpoena it served pursuant to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA or the Act) on the Forest County Potawatomi Community
(Tribe) in its capacity as proprietor of Potawatomi Bingo Casino. The subpoena sought
information relating to a charge of discrimination filed by Federico Colón, who was not a
member of the Tribe but who was employed at the Casino as a “security shift manager.”
The Tribe contended that it was not subject to the ADEA and that therefore the
subpoena was invalid. It also contended that the subpoena should not be enforced
because the EEOC had failed to conciliate and because the subpoena sought irrelevant
information. The Tribe’s primary argument as to why it was not covered by the ADEA
was that it was not an “employer” within the meaning of the Act. The court concluded
that the ADEA was generally applicable and therefore presumed to apply to Indian
tribes; that the Tribe’s relationship with Colón was covered by the ADEA; that the EEOC
was not bound by a statement made in a dismissal determination; that sovereign
immunity does not prevent the Tribe from having to comply with the EEOC’s subpoena;
and that information relating to age-based complaints made by employees other than
Colón around and after the time of his termination is relevant. The court ordered that
the Tribe shall comply with the subpoena within thirty days.
52.
Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians, No. S-13-1044, 2014
WL 1922783 (E.D. Cal. 2014). Tribe member brought California state court action
against tribe and tribal health program and board, alleging, inter alia, that tribe member
was wrongfully terminated due to her illness in violation of the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA). Following removal, tribe moved to dismiss. The district court held
that tribe waived sovereign immunity by removing action to federal court. Motion
granted in part and denied in part.
53.
Caddo Nation of Okla. v. Court of Indian Offenses for the Anadarko
Agency, No. 14-281, 2014 WL 3880464 (W.D. Okla. 2014). Before the Court was
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. This action arose out of a dispute between two
competing factions, each claiming, to the exclusion of the other, to have leadership of
and control over the Caddo Nation of Oklahoma. A faction supporting Vice–Chairman
Phillip Smith, on behalf of the Caddo Nation of Oklahoma, filed suit on March 13, 2014,
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in the Court of Indian Offenses for the Caddo Nation of Oklahoma, Anadarko,
Oklahoma. That faction obtained emergency injunctive relief to enjoin Plaintiff Brenda
Edwards from acting as Chairperson for the Caddo Nation. The Court of Indian
Offenses for the Caddo Nation, Anadarko, Oklahoma is the Defendant in this action.
Defendant is one of the courts established by the United States Department of the
Interior pursuant to 25 C.F.R. Part 11. On March 20, 2014, Plaintiffs, a faction
supporting Brenda Edwards, commenced this action on behalf of the Caddo Nation of
Oklahoma and moved for issuance of a temporary restraining order. Plaintiffs sought to
enjoin the enforcement of the Emergency Order issued by the CFR Court against
Plaintiff Brenda Edwards.
The Court denied the request for issuance of a temporary restraining order,
finding Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b). It was wellestablished that as a matter of comity, a federal court should not exercise jurisdiction
over cases arising under its federal question or diversity jurisdiction, if those cases are
also subject to tribal jurisdiction, until the parties have exhausted their tribal remedies.
Plaintiffs contended the tribal exhaustion requirement should not apply because the
CFR Court was not a tribal court and further, because the CFR Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to consider the dispute. The Court rejected Plaintiffs’ contentions and
found that Plaintiffs’ contentions are based on the false presumption that the CFR Court
clearly lacks jurisdiction over the dispute between the two factions.
The proceedings in the CFR Court were the first to be filed and a factual record
has been made in those proceedings addressing the jurisdictional issue. Plaintiffs have
the opportunity to be heard in that forum, to raise the jurisdictional challenges there, and
to appeal any adverse determination. The Court found it should abstain from exercising
jurisdiction until Plaintiffs have fully exhausted the remedies available to them in the
tribal courts. When tribal remedies are fully exhausted, Plaintiffs may then, if
necessary, proceed in federal court. The Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
and dismissed the action without prejudice to refiling.
I. Religious Freedom
54.
Chance v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, et al., No. 12-41015, 2013
WL 4517263 (5th Cir. 2013). State prisoner brought action against prison officials,
challenging restrictions on his Native American religious practices under the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The District Court, 2012 WL
3257836, adopted report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge, 2012 WL 3257813,
and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Prisoner appealed. The
Appellate Court held that: (1) prison’s complete ban on communal pipe-smoking did not
violate RLUIPA; (2) prison’s schedule of Native American religious services did not

	
  

479

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL

Volume III, Issue II - Spring 2015

	
  
violate RLUIPA; (3) prison policy limiting Native American Smudging ritual to outdoor
ceremonies did not violate RLUIPA, but (4) genuine issue of material fact with regard to
whether prison’s refusal to allow prisoner to possess locks of relatives’ hair in
accordance with his Native American religious practice was least restrictive means of
furthering prison’s compelling interests precluded summary judgment. Affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded.
55.
Yellowbear v. Lampert, No. 12–8048, 2014 WL 241981 (10th Cir. 2014).
State prisoner commenced action against individual prison officials, seeking prospective
injunctive relief against them for violations of Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). The District Court granted summary judgment for prison
personnel. Prisoner appealed. The Appellate Court held that factual issue existed as to
whether preventing state prisoner from exercising his sincerely held religious belief that
using sweat lodge cleansed and purified his mind, spirit, and body served compelling
governmental interest and that it was least restrictive means of furthering that interest.
Vacated and remanded.
56.
State v. Armitage, Nos. SCWC–29794, SCWC–29795, SCWC–29796,
2014 WL 305638, __ P.3d __ (Haw. 2014). Three defendants, all native Hawaiians,
were each charged by complaint with entering the Kahojolawe island reserve without
authorization, a petty misdemeanor. The cases were consolidated. The parties entered
into a stipulation as to evidence, and the District Court found defendants guilty as
charged. Defendants appealed. The Intermediate Court of Appeals, 2013 WL
1829663, affirmed. Defendants filed an application for writ of certiorari, which the
Supreme Court accepted. The Supreme Court held that: (1) complaints did not allege
the requisite state of mind, requiring dismissal without prejudice; (2) statute of limitations
did not bar the prosecution from refiling complaints against defendants; (3) evidence
was sufficient to support the convictions; (4) native Hawaiian privilege did not bar the
convictions; (5) defendants had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
administrative rule prohibiting a person from entering the reserve without authorization;
(6) expressed purpose of defendants in entering the reserve involved conduct that did
not constitute speech protected under the First Amendment; and (7) defendants did not
show that the exercise of their religion was substantially burdened by the prohibition rule
or a related procedure rule. Vacated and remanded.
57.
Rayellen Resources, Inc. v. New Mexico Cultural Properties Review
Committee, No. 33,497, 2014 WL 486088 (N.M. 2014). Objectors sought review of
decision of Cultural Properties Review Committee to permanently list approximately
400,000 acres of public land on mountain as a registered cultural property under
Cultural Properties Act. The Fifth Judicial District Court affirmed in part and reversed in
part. Proponents petitioned for certiorari and objectors cross-petitioned for certiorari.
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The Court of Appeals granted petitions and certified case. The Supreme Court held
that: (1) notice about public comment period satisfied procedural due process; (2) the
listing satisfied Act requirements on maintenance, inspection, and integrity; (3) land
grant common lands did not constitute “state land” subject to regulation under Act;
(4) substantial evidence supported Committee’s findings on historic eligibility;
(5) Committee had discretion to fine-tune boundaries during course of Committee’s
investigation of request for a permanent listing; (6) Committee’s apparent clerical error
in calculating total number of acres did not render the listing arbitrary and capricious;
and (7) the listing did not violate Establishment Clause. Affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded.
58.
Native American Council of Tribes v. Weber, Nos. 13–1401, 13–2745,
2014 WL 1644130, 750 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2014). Native American organization and
inmates brought action against prison officials, claiming that the prison's policy of
prohibiting tobacco use by Native American inmates during religious activities
substantially burdened the exercise of their religious beliefs in violation of the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The District Court, 897 F. Supp.
2d 828, found the restrictions violated RLUIPA and ordered parties to confer. After the
parties failed to agree on a new tobacco policy, the District Court, 2013 WL 310633,
entered a remedial order granting injunctive relief. The prison officials appealed. The
Appellate Court held that: (1) the inmates' use of tobacco during Native American
ceremonies was a religious exercise; (2) the prison's complete ban on tobacco use
substantially burdened the exercise of the inmates' religious beliefs; (3) a complete ban
was not the least restrictive means of furthering the prison's interest in order and
security; and (4) the District Court's remedial order was narrowly tailored to remedy the
violation of inmates' rights. Affirmed.
59.
Sharp v. Gay, No. 2:11 CV 925, 2014 WL 3556341 (D. Ariz. 2014).
Plaintiff Gabriel Sheridan Sharp, a Mojave Indian and an inmate at the Central Arizona
Correctional Facility (CACF), brought suit against Charles Ryan, Director of the Arizona
Department of Corrections (ADOC). Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Sharp claimed all
defendants denied him equal protection by refusing to allow Native American inmates
an additional weekly “turnout,” the prison’s term for a scheduled inmate religious
activity. Sharp also claimed that ADOC policy regarding inmate access to firewood, the
fuel for Native American sweat ceremonies, violated RLUIPA. The Court denied
Sharp’s Equal Protection Clause claim but his RLUIPA claim was granted. ADOC was
directed to establish a group religious account.
60.
Haight, et al. v. Thompson, et al., No. 13-6005, 2014 WL 1092969, (6th
Cir. 2014). Death-row inmates filed a lawsuit under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) for a variety of reasons – some related to
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requests to practice their Native American faith and some related to a request for clergy
visits. Three inmates claimed that prison officials violated the Act by denying them
access to a sweat lodge for religious ceremonies and refusing to provide traditional
foods for Native American religious ceremonies. The inmates offered to pay for the
lodge. The state commissioner promised a decision “in the near future,” more than four
years ago and since has not issued a decision yet. The three inmates also requested
Native American foods for their annual powwow.
The District Court granted summary judgment to the prison officials on the sweatlodge and ceremonial-foods requests, holding that the inmates failed as a matter of law
to support their claims under RLUIPA. The second group of inmates contends that
prison officials violated RLUIPA when they failed to facilitate inmate access to visiting
clergy members. Before June 2010, the Kentucky State Penitentiary had regularly
granted visiting clergy members the opportunity to see prison inmates under a “special
visit” exception to the prison visitation policy. But the practice changed when prison
officials discovered that it conflicted with statewide prison procedures. The Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act prohibits state and local governments from
placing “a substantial burden” on the “religious exercise” of any inmate unless they
establish that the burden furthers a “compelling governmental interest” and does so in
the “least restrictive” way. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a).
The appeal presented three questions: (1) Is there a triable issue of fact over
whether RLUIPA gives the inmates a right to have access to a sweat lodge for faithbased ceremonies? (2) Is there a triable issue of fact over whether RLUIPA gives the
inmates a right to buffalo meat and other traditional foods for a faith-based once-a-year
powwow? (3) Does RLUIPA permit inmates to collect money damages from prison
officials sued in their individual capacities?
The answers, respectively, were yes, yes and no. RLUIPA applies to prisons
that receive federal funds and prohibits state and local governments from placing “a
substantial burden” on the “religious exercise” of any inmate unless they establish that
the burden furthers a “compelling governmental interest” and does so in the “least
restrictive” way. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a). To establish a cognizable claim under
RLUIPA, the inmate must first demonstrate that a prison policy substantially burdens a
religious practice. So long as the practice is traceable to a sincerely held religious
belief, see Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005), it does not matter
whether the inmates' preferred exercise is “central” to his faith, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–
5(7)(A). Once an inmate makes this showing, the prison policy survives only if it serves
a compelling governmental interest in the least restrictive way. Id. § 2000cc–1(a).
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61.
White v. University of California, No. 12–17489, 2014 WL 4211421, 765
F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2014). Scientists brought declaratory judgment action against a
tribal repatriation committee, university, its regents, and certain of its officials, opposing
repatriation of aboriginal human remains that had been possessed by federally funded
museums and educational institutions since their discovery on university property during
archaeological field excavation project. The District Court dismissed the complaint.
Scientists appealed. The Appellate Court held that: (1) scientists had standing to bring
action seeking a declaration that the remains were not “Native American” within
meaning of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA);
(2) NAGPRA did not abrogate tribes' sovereign immunity from suit; (3) the tribal
repatriation committee was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity as an arm of the tribe;
(4) the tribal repatriation committee did not waive its sovereign immunity; (5) the tribes
and repatriation committee were necessary parties; (6) the tribes and repatriation
committee were indispensable parties; and (7) the public rights exception to compulsory
joinder rule did not apply. Affirmed
J. Sovereign Immunity
62.
Swanda Bros., Inc. v. Chasco Constructors, Ltd., L.L.P, et al., No.
CIV–08–199–D, 2013 WL 4520203 (W.D. Okla. 2013). Before the Court was the
renewed motion of Defendant Kiowa Casino Operations Authority (KCOA) to dismiss
the claims due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. KCOA argued that the Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because KCOA was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity from
liability on the claims asserted by plaintiff because it was an instrumentality of the Kiowa
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma (KIC). Evidence was presented which referenced a July 9,
2005 meeting at which the KIC considered a ballot initiative authorizing KCOA to enter
into financing and other agreements with regard to the construction of a gaming facility.
Because KCOA had previously represented to the Court that no election had taken
place, the Court determined the new evidence warranted reopening the matter. The
Court further found that the KIC validly authorized KCOA to consent to jurisdiction in the
state and federal courts, and to thereby waive tribal sovereign immunity, by authorizing
it to execute agreements containing mandatory arbitration clauses and/or agreements to
consent to federal and state court jurisdiction. The Court found that KCOA validly
waived tribal sovereign immunity in executing the Chasco Construction Agreement.
Accordingly, the renewed motion to dismiss was denied.
63.
Carsten v. Inter-tribal Council of Nevada et al., No. 3:12–cv–00493,
2013 WL 4736709 (D. Nev. 2013). Before the Court was defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
and Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff was employed by ITCN as the
program director for the Women, Infants and Children (WIC) program until she was
terminated on or about July 9, 2012. Plaintiff alleged that, prior to termination, she had
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a serious medical condition that made her eligible for time off under the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. Plaintiff claimed that defendants
violated the FMLA by: (1) refusing to let the plaintiff leave; and (2) terminating her for
requesting leave. Defendants argued that the ITCN is entitled to sovereign immunity.
They moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b) and
offered affidavits in support.
As there is no clear waiver or congressional abrogation in this case, the question
the Court faces is whether the ITCN, as an inter-tribal council and not a tribe itself, can
rightfully be entitled to sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is not limited to the
tribe itself. “When the tribe establishes an entity to conduct certain activities, the entity
is immune if it functions as an arm of the tribe.” Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d
1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Sovereign immunity thus exists where
the relevant entity’s activities can be properly attributed to the tribe. While the Ninth
Circuit has not ruled on whether an inter-tribal council is entitled to sovereign immunity,
in Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc., 157 F.3d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir. 1998), the
Ninth Circuit held that a non-profit inter-tribal council is properly considered a tribe for
the purposes of the Indian tribe exception of Title VII. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit
looked to the reasoning in Dille v. Council of Energy Res. Tribes, 801 F.2d 373, 375–76
(10th Cir. 1986), which held that Congress intended to exempt individual tribes and
collective efforts by Indian tribes because “the purpose of the tribal exemption, like the
purpose of sovereign immunity itself, was to promote the ability of Indian tribes to
control their own enterprises.” See Pink, 157 F.3d at 1188. Tribal immunity extended to
employees of a tribe “acting in their official capacity and within the scope of their
authority.” Cook v. AVI Casino Enter., Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 727 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff
sued Sterns and Crawford in their official capacity only. Plaintiff argued that the FMLA
applies to the ITCN but the Court need not reach that argument. Absent clear waiver or
congressional abrogation, the Court did not have the subject matter jurisdiction to
consider this case. The cases cited by plaintiff in support of its argument that the ITCN
is an employer subject to the FMLA were inapplicable. Those cases considered
whether a general federal statute applied to a tribe or tribal entity in suits brought by the
tribes or the federal government. Therefore, sovereign immunity was not an issue in
those cases. The Court granted the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint with prejudice and denied the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as moot.
64.
Martin v. Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma, No. 13–CV–0143, 2013 WL
5274236 (N.D. Okla. 2013). (From the opinion.) Before the Court were the Motion of
the Defendant to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to Amend Petition. The Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma (the Tribe), defendant,
argued that it had not waived its sovereign immunity from suit for tort claims arising at
its gaming facilities and that plaintiff must pursue his claim against the Tribe’s
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subdivisions in tribal court. Plaintiff responded that sovereign immunity was waived or
should be treated as though it had been waived. On October 9, 2012, Todd Martin filed
this case in the District Court of Ottawa County, Oklahoma, alleging that the Tribe
operates the Downstream Casino and Resort (the Casino) in Ottawa County,
Oklahoma, and that he was harmed on January 19, 2011, by a dangerous condition on
the property when he was a Casino patron. A compact was entered into between the
Tribe and the State of Oklahoma regulating gaming on tribal land, entitled “Tribal–State
Gaming Compact Between the Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma and the State of Oklahoma”
(the Compact). The Casino is operated and managed by the Downstream Development
Authority of the Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma (Development Authority). Because the
Development Authority manages the Casino (and the games played within), it is the
relevant “enterprise” under the Compact. The Development Authority carries the
insurance required by the Compact. Defendant argues that plaintiff’s petition should be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the Tribe’s sovereign
immunity. The Compact does not unequivocally waive the Tribe’s sovereign immunity.
It waives only the enterprise’s sovereign immunity, and only in limited cases.
Because the Tribe had not consented to suit and there was no congressional
authorization for suit, the Tribe was entitled to sovereign immunity. Even if the
enterprise could be sued, any such waiver of sovereign immunity was not imputed to
the Tribe. The petition was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
65.
Sheffer, et al. v. Buffalo Run Casino, PTE, Inc., et al, No. 109265, 315
P.3d 359, 2013 WL 5332615 (Okla. 2013). The driver of a tractor trailer and
passengers in tractor trailer sued Native American tribe and its casino under a theory of
dram-shop liability. The parties were injured when a tractor trailer collided with the
vehicle driven by the driver defendant. The driver of the tractor trailer was allegedly
intoxicated from drinking alcohol at a gaming casino. The District Court dismissed, sua
sponte, owner, determining that existing injunctions prohibited suit for any tort claims
against a tribe or a tribal entity. Plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1)
the tribe was immune from suit in state court for compact-based tort claims, overruling
Griffith v. Choctaw Casino of Pocola, 2009 OK 51, 230 P.3d 488; Dye v. Choctaw
Casino of Pocola, 2009 OK 52, 230 P.3d 507, Cossey v. Cherokee Nation Enters, 2009
OK 6, 212 P.3d 447; (2) the tribe did not expressly waive its sovereign immunity from
state dram shop claims when it applied for and received a state liquor license,
overruling Bittle v. Bahe, 2008 OK 10, 192 P.3d 810. Affirmed.
66.
Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc. v. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians, No. 13–cv–372, 2013 WL 5803778 (W.D. Wisc. 2013). Non-Indian
brokerage firm and bondholders, which were involved in a commercial transaction with
a tribal economic development corporation, brought an action seeking declaration that a
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tribal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over them and an injunction preventing any
further action by the tribe and its economic development corporation in a pending matter
against them in that forum. Tribal defendants moved to dismiss. The District Court held
that: (1) if forum selection clauses in documents created in connection with nonIndians’ commercial transaction with tribal economic development corporation were
valid, exhaustion of tribal remedies doctrine would not preclude federal court from
exercising jurisdiction over the suit; (2) tribal sovereign immunity did not preclude district
court from resolving suit; and (3) the Court would not decline to exercise declaratory
jurisdiction over non-Indians’ suit.
67.
Michigan v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, No. 13–1438,
2013 WL 6645395, 737 F.3d 1075 (6th Cir. 2013). State brought action to enjoin Indian
tribe from applying to have land taken into trust by Interior Secretary pursuant to
Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act. The District Court granted the state’s
motion for preliminary injunction, and the tribe appealed. The Appellate Court held that:
(1) the state’s claim that tribe’s trust submission would violate the tribal–state compact
was barred by tribe’s sovereign immunity, and (2) the state’s claim that Indian tribe’s
conduct of class III gaming on trust property would violate the tribal–state compact and
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) was not ripe for adjudication. Reversed.
68.
MM & A Productions, LLC v. Yavapai-Apache Nation, No. 2 CA–CV
2013–0051, 2014 WL 185396 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). An event production company filed
complaint against the Indian tribe and tribe’s casino, alleging breach of exclusive
entertainment and production agreement and associated claims. The Superior Court,
No. C20085949, dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Company appealed. The Appellate Court held that: (1) the alleged apparent authority
to waive the tribe’s sovereign immunity by signing agreement did not constitute valid
waiver; (2) the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that further
discovery was unnecessary to determine that agreement did not waive immunity; and
(3) the waiver of sovereign immunity signed prior to execution of agreement was
insufficient to waive immunity as to agreement. Affirmed.
69.
People v. Miami Nation Enterprises, No. B242644, 2014 WL 216318
(Cal. Ct. App. 2014). The People brought action against five payday lenders for
injunctive relief, restitution, and civil penalties for violations of the Deferred Deposit
Transaction Law (DDTL). Two tribal entities specially appeared and moved to quash
service of summons. The Superior Court denied the motion. Companies filed petition
for writ of mandate. The Court of Appeal denied petition. Companies filed petition for
review. The Supreme Court granted petition and transferred the matter to the Court of
Appeal. The Court of Appeal granted petition in part and denied it in part, 169 Cal. App.
4th 81, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572. The Superior Court quashed service of summons and

	
  

486

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL

Volume III, Issue II - Spring 2015

	
  
dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The People appealed. The
Court of Appeal held that: (1) the tribal economic development authority was protected
by tribal sovereign immunity, and (2) the tribal corporation was protected by tribal
sovereign immunity. Affirmed.
70.
Bonnet v. Harvest (U.S.) Holdings, Inc., No. 12–4068, 2014 WL 292616
(10th Cir. 2014). Petroleum landman, and his sole proprietorship, brought action
against various companies and individuals arising from Tribe’s termination of his
contract to provide independent consultant services. Plaintiff served Tribe with
non-party subpoena duces tecum requesting documents. The District Court, 2012 WL
994403, denied the Tribe’s motion to quash based on tribal immunity. Tribe appealed.
The Appellate Court held that: (1) the denial of motion to quash based on tribal
immunity was an immediately appealable collateral order, and (2) as matter of first
impression in Circuit, the subpoena itself was “suit” against Tribe triggering tribal
sovereign immunity. Reversed.
71.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 13–2498, 2014 WL 702193 (1st Cir.
2014). Government moved to compel compliance by Indian tribe’s historic preservation
office with subpoena duces tecum that was issued by since-defunct grand jury,
representing that investigation had been transferred to a newly-empanelled grand jury.
The preservation office objected and moved to quash subpoena on grounds of tribal
sovereign immunity and unreasonableness. After granting the motion to compel and
issuing a show cause order due to preservation office’s noncompliance, the District
Court held the preservation office in civil contempt. Preservation office appealed. The
Appellate Court held that: (1) the subpoena could not be enforced by civil contempt
sanctions after expiration of issuing grand jury; (2) the exception to mootness doctrine
applied to warrant review of preservation office’s additional challenges to subpoena;
(3) tribal sovereign immunity provided no refuge from subpoena power of federal grand
jury; and (4) denial of motion to quash subpoena as unreasonable was not abuse of
discretion. Vacated.
72.
City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, No.
A12–1324, 2014 WL 949284, 843 N.W. 2d 577 (Minn. 2014). (from the opinion) In
April 2012, respondent City of Duluth (the City) commenced an action in state District
Court against appellant Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa (the Band),
alleging breach of a 1986 contract regarding a casino in Duluth. The District Court
dismissed the lawsuit after concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because
the Band had only consented to suit in Federal Court in a 1994 agreement amending
the 1986 contract. The Court of Appeals reversed after concluding that Minnesota
courts have subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. The Court granted review and
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reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated the District Court’s judgment for
the Band.
73.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of South Florida v. Bermudez, No. 3D13–
2153, 2014 WL 2965411, 143 So. 3d 157 (Fla. Ct. App. 2014). The Miccosukee Tribe
of Indians of South Florida appeals from a final judgment of $4.1 million. This matter
began when Carlos Bermudez sued two members of the Tribe, Tammy Gwen Billie and
Jimmie Bert, for damages resulting from an automobile accident in which a car driven
by Billie and owned by Bert crashed into Bermudez’s car, killing Bermudez’s wife and
injuring Bermudez and his son. Following a jury verdict, a final judgment was entered
against Billie and Bert for $3.177 million. The Tribe was not a party when the final
judgment was entered. Bermudez has yet to collect the judgment, as Billie and Bert
assert they have no assets. Several years after the first final judgment was entered,
Bermudez filed a motion to add the Tribe as a judgment debtor in the matter because
the Tribe had funded and guided Billie and Bert’s defense in the lawsuit. The Tribe
objected on several grounds, including sovereign immunity. Following an evidentiary
hearing, the Trial Court entered an order granting Bermudez’s motion and the Trial
Court accordingly entered a second final judgment in favor of Bermudez and solely
against the Tribe for the full amount of the original final judgment, plus interest, for a
total judgment of just over $4.1 million.
That final judgment did not reference the earlier final judgment against Billie and
Bert, which remains in effect. This appeal followed. Because Bermudez had not
established some cognizable legal basis to add the Tribe as a judgment debtor, the
Court did not address the Tribe’s claim of sovereign immunity. Reversed and
remanded.
74.
Black v. U.S., No. C13–5415, 2014 WL 3337466 (W.D. Wash. 2014).
Before the Court was the Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed by defendants Suquamish Indian
Tribe, Suquamish Tribal Police, Port Gamble S’Klallam Indian Tribe (PGST), PGST
Tribal Police (collectively, Tribes), PGST Detective Greg Graves, and 25 John Doe
Officers. The Tribes contended that tribal sovereign immunity shielded them and their
officers from suit in federal court. Plaintiff Sherri Black claimed that neither the Tribes,
nor their officers, were entitled to tribal sovereign immunity because they were acting
under the color of state law when they entered the Blacks’ home, or alternatively, that
they waived this immunity through treaty.
In December 2011, Suquamish and Port S’Klallam tribal police officers jointly
executed a tribe-issued misdemeanor arrest warrant for PGST member Stacy Stanley
Callihoo. Shortly after he entered the home, Tribal Officer Greg Graves shot Thomas
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Black five times as he was lying on a couch. The unique complexities of tribal
sovereignty rendered the Court an inappropriate forum for Ms. Black to seek relief
against the Indian tribes themselves. Her Complaint’s allegations failed to strip the
Tribes of their sovereign immunity. Black pleaded sufficient facts to state a viable
§ 1983 claim against the tribal police acting in their individual capacities, under color of
state law. For these reasons, defendant Tribes’ Motion to Dismiss Black’s claims
against the Suquamish and Port Gamble S’Klallam Indian Tribes for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction was granted. Black’s Motion to Amend was denied, so her only
remaining claims against tribal Defendants were against Greg Graves.
The Motion to Dismiss Black’s claims against Graves was denied.
75.
Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Seneca Cnty, N.Y., No. 12–3723,
2014 WL 3746795, __ F.3d __ (2nd Cir. 2014). A Native-American tribe brought action
seeking permanent declaratory and injunctive relief against the county’s attempts to
collect property taxes on five parcels of land purchased by tribe. The District Court, 890
F. Supp. 2d 240, granted the tribe’s motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin the
county from foreclosing on properties pursuant to New York law. County appealed.
The Appellate Court held that tribal sovereign immunity protected the tribe from suit.
Affirmed.
76.
Chavez v. Morongo Casino Resort & Spa, No. E056191, 2014 WL
4053805 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). Six former employees of Morongo Casino Resort & Spa
(Employees) are non-Indians who were employed by Morongo in the security
department. Employees were terminated at different times during the years 2010 and
2011. Employees sued (1) Morongo Casino Resort & Spa (Morongo), also known as
Morongo Gaming Agency, and also known as Morongo Band of Mission Indians;
(2) Jerry Schultze, the Executive Director for the Morongo Gaming Agency; as well as
(3) various Morongo management members, for (1) retaliation based upon
discrimination; (2) discrimination; (3) age discrimination; (4) sexual discrimination;
(5) harassment, in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA);
(6) wrongful termination, in violation of FEHA and public policy; (7) failure to prevent
workplace discrimination; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (9) negligent
infliction of emotional distress; (10) defamation; and (11) breach of contract. The Trial
Court ordered the complaint and service of the summons be quashed because the Trial
Court lacked jurisdiction over Morongo, due to Morongo being “immune to unconsented”
lawsuits, and not having consented to Employees’ suit. Therefore, the Trial Court
ordered the Employees’ lawsuit dismissed in its entirety without leave to amend.
On appeal Employees contended the Trial Court erred because 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360 abrogated Morongo’s sovereign immunity in relation to civil claims. Second, in
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the alternative, Employees asserted the Trial Court erred because, in Morongo’s 2008
Amended Compact with the State of California, Morongo expressly agreed to waive its
sovereign immunity in relation to bodily injury, property damage, or personal injury
arising out of operating the casino. Third, Employees asserted the Trial Court erred by
(a) preventing Employees from petitioning the court for an order compelling arbitration,
and (b) not ordering the parties to participate in arbitration. Morongo and the individual
defendants specially appeared at the Trial Court, moving the court to quash the
complaint and service of summons because “Morongo Band is a federally-recognized
American Indian tribe [citation] that is immune from unconsented suit and has not
consented either to the creation of the purported causes of action alleged against it or to
this Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate those purported causes of action against any of the
defendants . . . .” Morongo asserted the individual defendants were sued in their official
capacities, and thus were “cloaked with the Morongo Band’s sovereign immunity,” and
therefore were also not subject to the Trial Court’s jurisdiction. Morongo argued that it
could only be subject to the Trial Court’s jurisdiction if it expressly waived its sovereign
immunity, and no waiver was made that would allow for jurisdiction in Employees’
lawsuit. The appellate affirmed the judgment.
77.
Mastro v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, No. 13–13886, 2014 WL 4085819,
578 Fed. Appx. 801 (11th Cir. 2014). Stephanie Mastro appealed the District Court's
dismissal of her amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to
state a claim. Ms. Mastro, formerly employed as a card dealer at Seminole Indian
Casino—Immokalee, sued the Seminole Tribe of Florida, d/b/a Seminole Indian
Casino—Immokalee, for gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Florida Civil Rights Act. The Tribe moved to
dismiss, arguing that Ms. Mastro failed to state a claim and that the District Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because the Tribe and Casino were entitled to tribal immunity.
The District Court agreed and granted the Tribe's motion. It held that, because
Congress did not abrogate tribal immunity with regard to Title VII, sovereign immunity
barred Ms. Mastro's claims against the Tribe. It likewise extended this logic to shield
the Casino; it concluded that because it was wholly owned, operated by the Tribe, and
formed pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the Casino constituted a
subordinate arm of the Tribe and was therefore immune from suit. The District Court's
dismissal of Ms. Mastro's complaint was affirmed.
78.
Outsource Services Mgmt, LLC v. Nooksack Bus. Corp., No. 88482–0,
2014 WL 4108073, 181 P.3d 272 (Wash. 2014). Washington State courts have
jurisdiction over civil cases arising on Indian reservations as long as they do not infringe
on the sovereignty of the tribe. At issue in this case is whether Washington State courts
have jurisdiction over a civil case arising out of a contract in which the tribal corporation
waived its sovereign immunity and consented to jurisdiction in Washington State courts.
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Nooksack Business Corporation (Nooksack), a tribal enterprise of the Nooksack Indian
Tribe, signed a contract with Outsource Services Management LLC to finance the
renovation and expansion of its casino. The contract contained a clause related to
sovereign immunity and jurisdiction.
Outsource and Nooksack executed three successive forbearance agreements,
but after Nooksack failed to make required payments, Outsource filed suit in Whatcom
County Superior Court for breach of the loan agreement. Nooksack acknowledged that
it had waived sovereign immunity but argued that nonetheless, Whatcom County
Superior Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case because it involved
a contractual dispute with a tribal enterprise that occurred on tribal land. The Trial Court
denied Nooksack's motion to dismiss, ruling that it had subject matter jurisdiction
because Nooksack both waived sovereign immunity and consented to the jurisdiction of
Washington State courts. The Trial Court also certified its order for interlocutory appeal.
Nooksack appealed, and the Court of Appeals found that review of the jurisdictional
issue was justified. The Court of Appeals issued a broader holding than the Trial Court,
concluding that the waiver of sovereign immunity alone was sufficient to give the
Superior Court subject matter jurisdiction in the case. Nooksack petitioned for review,
which was granted. The Supreme Court addressed the broad scope of the Court of
Appeals opinion, which held that Nooksack's waiver of sovereign immunity was enough
– in and of itself – to confer subject matter jurisdiction on Washington State courts.
Such a broad holding is not necessary to resolve this case, where Nooksack both
waived sovereign immunity and consented to state court jurisdiction. The issue of
whether state court jurisdiction can be based solely on a waiver of sovereign immunity
is not presented in this case, and thus we take no position on it. The Court found that
Nooksack consensually entered into a contract in which it waived sovereign immunity
and consented to the jurisdiction of Washington State courts. It held that State Court
jurisdiction does not infringe on tribal sovereignty. The Court affirmed the Court of
Appeals.
K. Sovereignty, Tribal Inherent
79.
North Cent. Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. North Dakota Pub. Serv. Comm’n, et
al., No. 20130075, 837 N.W. 2d 138, 2013 WL 4714327 (N.D. 2013). Electric utility
appealed order of the Public Service Commission, dismissing utility’s complaint
challenging competing electric utility’s extension of electric service to a facility owned by
Indian tribe on tribal trust land within Indian reservation. The District Court affirmed the
Commission order, and utility appealed. The Supreme Court held that Commission
lacked authority to regulate the tribe’s decision to have competing utility provide electric
service to a tribal-owned facility on tribal-owned land within the reservation. Affirmed.
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80.
St. Isidore Farm LLC, et al. v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Indians, et al.,
No. 2:13–CV–00274, 2013 WL 4782140 (D. Idaho 2013). Plaintiffs St. Isidore Farm,
LLC and Gobers, LLC asked the Court to enjoin and restrain the Coeur d’Alene Tribe of
Indians and the Coeur d’Alene Tribal Court from levying civil fines, placing liens on the
real property owned by Plaintiff St. Isidore Farm LLC and pursuing criminal actions
against the Plaintiffs for the land application of domestic sewage sludge (septage) to
non public contact sites from which there is no discharge into waterways. Plaintiffs
alleged they are in compliance with all federal and state regulations for the discharge of
septage and received approval from the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality for
human waste application on the non-Indian fee land. It is undisputed that the Tribe
adopted a resolution on March 6, 2013, enacting Chapter 57 of the Coeur d’Alene Tribal
Code entitled “Tribal Waste Management Act” which appears to prohibit the septage
disposal process being used by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argued the Tribe’s more restrictive
discharge provisions were not applicable to non Indian land owned by non Indians
located within the boundaries of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation. Plaintiffs alleged they
were being fined by the Tribe for their actions and were facing criminal liability as well
as liens being placed on their property for not being in compliance with the Tribe’s laws
and regulations. Plaintiffs filed a motion for injunctive relief in this Court to enjoin the
defendants from attempting to enforce Tribal ordinances against them. The Tribe filed
suit in Tribal Court against the Plaintiffs on June 3, 2013. Plaintiffs appeared and
answered the Complaint in Tribal Court, but contest the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction over
this matter. Defendants filed declarations indicating that no criminal prosecutions have
been initiated against Plaintiffs. The Court granted defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as
Plaintiffs must first exhaust their claims in Tribal Court before coming to Federal Court.
The Court found that the matter is administratively terminated with leave granted to the
parties move to reopen this matter if the Tribal Court determines it does not have
jurisdiction over the actions.
81.
In re Estate of Gopher, No. DA 12–0719, __ P.3d __, 2013 WL 5205233
(Mont. 2013). Son of mother, an enrolled member of Indian tribe who died intestate,
filed application for informal probate proceedings. Son’s siblings filed motion to dismiss,
asserting that jurisdiction over the matter lay with the Tribal Court. The District Court
denied motion and imposed a constructive trust on mother’s estate. Siblings appealed.
The Supreme Court held that District Court’s assumption of subject matter jurisdiction
over mother’s estate did not unlawfully infringe on tribe’s right of tribal self-government.
Affirmed.
82.
Evans v. Shoshone-Bannock Land Use Policy Comm’n, No. 13-35003,
2013 WL 6284359 (9th Cir. 2013). Property owner, contractor, and subcontractor
commenced action against Indian tribe, seeking declaratory judgment that tribal court
lacked jurisdiction over his construction of single family dwelling within reservation and
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preliminary injunction barring further tribal court proceedings against them. The District
Court, 2012 WL 6651194, dismissed action. Plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Court
held that: (1) construction of single-family house on land owned in fee simple by nonIndian in area that already had seen comparable development on reservation did not
threaten or have any direct effect on political integrity, economic security, or health or
welfare of tribe and (2) construction did not pose catastrophic risks, and thus tribe did
not have authority over nonmember’s construction. Affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded.
83.
Belcourt Pub. School Dist. v. Davis, Nos. 4:12–cv–114, 4:12–cv–115,
4:12-cv-116, 4:12–cv–117, 4:12–cv–118, 2014 WL 458075 (D.N.D. 2014). A number
of lawsuits have been commenced against the Belcourt Public School District (“School
District”) and its employees in Turtle Mountain Tribal Court. The Turtle Mountain Tribal
Court of Appeals has concluded that jurisdiction properly lies in tribal court. The School
District commenced actions, seeking a declaration that the tribal court lacks jurisdiction
over the School District and its employees. The limited jurisdictional issue before this
Court was whether a state political subdivision may be subjected to suit in a tribal forum
when it enters into a consensual agreement with a tribe to operate a high school on
tribal trust land. The Court found that Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.
Ct. 1245, 67 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1981) is inapplicable when determining the adjudicatory
authority over nonmembers who consensually agree to operate and conduct business in
conjunction with the tribe on tribal trust land. Even if Montana applies, the result would
be the same. The “first exception” in Montana allows tribal courts to exercise
jurisdiction when a nonmember has entered into a consensual relationship with a tribe
or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.
This case fits squarely within the plain language of the exception. The Court denied
Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment and remanded the cases to the Turtle
Mountain Tribal Court for consideration on the merits.
84.
Fort Yates Public School Dist. No. 4 v. Murphy ex rel. C.M.B., No.
1:12-cv-135, 2014 WL 458054, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (D.N.D. 2014). Plaintiff Fort
Yates Public School District #4 (“School District) filed a Complaint against Jamie
Murphy for C.M.B. (a minor) and Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court seeking declaratory
relief in the form of an Order declaring that the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court lacked
jurisdiction over public school districts and school district employees acting in their
official capacity, and an injunction prohibiting tribal court from adjudicating the claims
brought against the school by Jamie Murphy on behalf of her daughter C.M.B. Pending
before the Court was a motion by defendant Jamie Murphy to dismiss the action under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(7). The limited jurisdictional issue before the Court was whether a
state political subdivision may be subjected to suit in a tribal forum when it enters into a
consensual agreement with a tribe to operate a school on tribal trust land. The Court
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found that Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 67 L. Ed. 2d 493
(1981) was inapplicable when determining the adjudicatory authority over nonmembers
who consensually agreed to operate and conduct business in conjunction with the tribe
on tribal trust land. Even if Montana applied, the result would be the same. The “first
exception” in Montana allowed tribal courts to exercise jurisdiction when a nonmember
entered into a consensual relationship with a tribe or its members, through commercial
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. The Court found that Standing Rock
Sioux Tribal Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against the School District,
whether the framework set forth in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.
Ct. 1245, 67 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1981) applied or not and that the record was sufficiently
developed to decide the jurisdictional issue. The Court dismissed the action and
remanded the case to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court for consideration on the
merits. Jamie Murphy’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(7) was dismissed as moot.
85.
Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, No. 12–
60668, 2014 WL 994936, 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014). (From the opinion.) The Court
previously issued its opinion in this case on October 3, 2013. Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss.
Band of Choctaw Indians, 732 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2013). We hereby withdraw the
previous opinion and substitute the following. Dolgencorp, Inc. and Dollar General
Corp. (collectively “Dolgencorp”) brought an action in the District Court seeking to enjoin
John Doe, a member of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, and other defendants
(collectively “the tribal defendants”) from adjudicating tort claims against Dolgencorp in
the Choctaw tribal court. The District Court denied Dolgencorp’s motion for summary
judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the tribal defendants, concluding
that the Tribal Court may properly exercise jurisdiction over Doe’s claims. Because the
Court agreed that Dolgencorp’s consensual relationship with Doe gave rise to Tribal
Court jurisdiction over Doe’s claims under Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,
564-66 (1981), the Court affirmed the District Court’s judgment.
86.
Las Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians v. Phebus, No. 2:13–CV–02000,
2014 WL 1199593 (D. Nev. 2014). After Tribal Court of Appeals ruled that the Indian
Tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction over the defendant, who had been a member of the
Tribe before being disenrolled, the Tribe brought action seeking declaratory judgment
that it could assert criminal jurisdiction over any person satisfying the definition of
“Indian” under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), including the defendant. The
defendant failed to appear, and the Tribe moved for summary judgment. The District
Court held that: (1) the Indian Tribe had authority to assert criminal jurisdiction over any
person qualifying as an Indian under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), so long as it
proved the defendant’s Indian status beyond a reasonable doubt, but (2) the Tribal
Court erred in declaring the defendant to be an Indian for purposes of tribal criminal
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jurisdiction without submitting the question to a jury for a finding beyond a reasonable
doubt. Motion granted in part and denied in part.
87.
Kelsey v. Pope, No. 1:09–CV–1015, 2014 WL 1338170 (W.D. Mich.
2014). (From the opinion.) The issue in this case was whether a Tribal Court has
jurisdiction over a misdemeanor crime between an accused Indian perpetrator, the
Petitioner Norbert J. Kelsey, that allegedly occurred during a tribal meeting in a building
owned by the tribe but located off the tribe's reservation and wherein the alleged victim
was also a tribal member.
The Magistrate Judge opined in a Report and
Recommendation that tribal courts do not have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes outside
of Indian country, and also found that Kelsey's due process rights were violated when
the tribal court expanded its jurisdiction in the criminal ordinance. The Court agrees
with the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that the tribal courts lacked jurisdiction in this
case. This conclusion is supported by Supreme Court precedent, as well as the
legislative framework for concurrent jurisdiction in Indian country. Accordingly, the
Court granted the Petition for Habeas Corpus.
88.
State v. Lang, No. 1 CA–CV 12–0629, 2014 WL 1691613, 323 P.3d 457
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
State Bar brought action against nonmember, alleging
unauthorized practice of law. The Superior Court, Maricopa County, No. CV2009–
012054, granted State Bar's motion for summary judgment and entered permanent
injunction restraining nonmember from performing acts constituting the practice of law in
Arizona. Nonmember appealed. The Appellate Court held that: (1) the nonmember,
who had a law degree and was admitted to practice law in tribal court, engaged in
unauthorized practice of law in representation of three clients; (2) injunction was not
unconstitutionally overbroad in restricting nonmember from maintaining a business
address for a law practice anywhere within state of Arizona other than within boundaries
of a tribal jurisdiction in which he was admitted to practice; and (3) the injunction was
not unconstitutionally overbroad in barring nonmember from referring to himself as a
“J.D.” or “attorney” and required him to disclaim State Bar membership in his letterhead
and advertising material. Affirmed.
89.
Billie v. Stier, No. 3D13–3180, 2014 WL 1613661(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2014). (From the opinion.) “This Petition for a Writ of Prohibition evolves out of a
custody dispute between the mother, who was a member of the Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians, and the father, who was not a member of the tribe or of Native American
heritage. The issue was whether the Miccosukee Tribal Court or the Circuit Court of the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit had the jurisdiction to decide the custody dispute. The mother
petitioned for a writ prohibiting the Circuit Court from exercising jurisdiction over the
custody matter. Based on the facts of this case and the Uniform Child Custody,
Jurisdiction, and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), the Court concluded that the Circuit
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Court was correct in determining that it, and not the Tribal Court, has jurisdiction to
decide the custody issues and we therefore deny the petition.
90.
Simmonds v. Parks, No. S–14103, 2014 WL 3537863, 329 P.3d 995,
(Alaska 2014). A father, whose parental rights were terminated by the Minto Tribal
Court, filed a complaint with the Alaska Superior Court requesting physical custody of
child. The Superior Court concluded that the Minto Tribal Court’s judgment was not
entitled to full faith and credit because the father had been denied minimum due
process. Foster parents filed petition for review. The Supreme Court granted the
petition and remanded the case. On remand, the Superior Court concluded that it was
not harmless error for the Minto Tribal Court to have failed to provide a meaningful
opportunity for father to challenge Minto’s jurisdiction over him. Foster parents filed
petition for review. The Supreme Court held that: (1) because the father failed to
exhaust available tribal court remedies by appealing to the Minto Court of Appeals, the
father was not permitted to relitigate his minimum due process and jurisdictional claims,
and therefore, the Supreme Court would accord full faith and credit to the Minto Tribal
Court’s judgment terminating father’s parental rights, and (2) the Indian Child Welfare
Act’s (ICWA) full faith and credit mandate applied to the Minto Tribal Court’s order which
terminated the parental rights of parents of Indian child.
91.
Jackson v. Payday Financial, LLC, No. 12–2617, 2014 WL 4116804,
764 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2014). Deborah Jackson, Linda Gonnella, and James Binkowski
(collectively “the Plaintiffs”) initially brought this action in Illinois state court against
Payday Financial, LLC, and other defendant entities owned by, or doing business with,
Martin A. Webb, an enrolled member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe. The Plaintiffs
alleged violations of Illinois civil and criminal statutes related to loans that they had
received from the Loan Entities. After the Loan Entities removed the case to the District
Court, that court granted the Loan Entities' motion to dismiss for improper venue under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). It held that the loan agreements required that
all disputes be resolved through arbitration conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe on the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Reservation, located within the geographic
boundaries of South Dakota. The Plaintiffs timely appealed. Following oral argument,
the Appellate Court ordered a limited remand to the District Court for further factual
findings concerning (1) whether the tribal law was readily available to the litigants and
(2) whether the arbitration under the auspices of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, as set
forth in the loan documents, was available to the parties. The District Court concluded
that, although the tribal law could be ascertained, the arbitral mechanism detailed in the
agreement did not exist. Based on these findings, the Court concluded that the
Plaintiffs' action should not have been dismissed because the arbitral mechanism
specified in the agreement is illusory. The Court cannot accept the Loan Entities'
alternative argument for upholding the District Court's dismissal: that the loan
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documents required any litigation to be conducted by a tribal court on the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe Reservation. As the Supreme Court explained most recently in Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 128 S. Ct. 2709, 171
L. Ed. 2d 457 (2008), tribal courts have a unique, limited jurisdiction that does not
extend generally to the regulation of nontribal members whose actions do not implicate
the sovereignty of the tribe or the regulation of tribal lands. The Loan Entities have not
established a colorable claim of tribal jurisdiction, and, therefore, exhaustion in tribal
courts is not required. The arbitration provision contained in the loan agreements is
unreasonable and substantively and procedurally unconscionable under federal, state,
and tribal law. The District Court, therefore, erred in granting the Defendants' motion to
dismiss for improper venue based on that provision. Additionally, the courts of the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe do not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs'
claims. Nor have the defendants raised a colorable claim of tribal jurisdiction necessary
to invoke the rule of tribal exhaustion. We therefore reverse the judgment of the District
Court.
L. Tax
92.
State ex rel. Wasden v. Native Wholesale Supply Co., No. 38780, 2013
WL 5642799, 312 P.3d 1257 (Idaho 2013). The state brought an action against an outof-state Indian-owned wholesaler for operating as a cigarette wholesaler without a
permit and for selling cigarettes that were unlawful for sale in Idaho. The District Court
enjoined the wholesaler from selling wholesale cigarettes without a wholesale permit
and assessed civil penalties. Wholesaler appealed. The Supreme Court held that:
(1) the wholesaler was not required to obtain wholesaler permit; (2) the State had
subject matter jurisdiction to prevent non-compliant cigarettes from being imported;
(3) the Indian Commerce Clause did not preclude regulation; (4) the Trial Court had
personal jurisdiction over wholesaler pursuant to long-arm statute; and (5) the exercise
of personal jurisdiction comported with due process. Affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded.
93.
HCI Distribution, Inc. v. New York State Police, 2013 WL 5745376
(N.Y. App. Div. 2013). Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, which granted
petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to direct immediate
release of seized property. Petitioner is an “economic and political subdivision” of a
federally recognized Indian tribe located in Nebraska. In January 2012, petitioner
purchased, among other things, more than 26,000 cartons of cigarettes and cigars from
a manufacturer located on the St. Regis Mohawk Indian Reservation in St. Lawrence
County and owned by the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe. The tobacco products were then
consigned to a common carrier to be delivered to petitioner in Nebraska. During
transport, the truck carrying the cigarettes was stopped at a United States Border Patrol
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checkpoint in St. Lawrence County and the Border Patrol authorities contacted the New
York State Police. The Court found that inasmuch as petitioner demonstrated neither a
clear legal right to the extraordinary remedy of prohibition nor the absence of an
adequate alternative remedy, the petition must be dismissed. The judgment was
reversed, on the law, without costs, and petition was dismissed.
94.
King Mountain Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and
Trade Bureau, No. 11-3038, 2014 WL 267160, 996 F. Supp. 2d 161 (E.D. Wash.
2014). An Indian tribe, tribal corporation, and tribe member brought action seeking
declaratory judgment that the corporation was not subject to payment of excise taxes on
tobacco products, a declaration that the tribe was entitled to meaningful consultation
and resolution of disputes with executive branch, and an injunction prohibiting Alcohol
and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) from preventing sale of corporation’s
products. United States moved for summary judgment. The District Court held that:
(1) the tobacco products were subject to federal excise tax; (2) the 1855 Yakama Treaty
did not exempt tribal corporation’s manufactured tobacco products from federal excise
taxes; and (3) the provision of Internal Revenue Code exempting articles of native
Indian handicraft did not exempt manufactured tobacco products. Motion granted.
95.
Smith v. Parker, No. 4:07CV3101, 2014 WL 558965, 996 F. Supp.
2d 815, (D. Neb. 2014). Owners of businesses and clubs that sold alcoholic beverages
brought action against Omaha Tribal Council members in their official capacities for
prospective injunctive and declaratory relief from the tribe’s attempt to enforce its liquorlicense and tax scheme on owners. The state of Nebraska and the United States
intervened. Parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The District Court held that
the Omaha Reservation was not diminished by the 1882 Act ratifying agreement for sale
of tribal lands to non-Indian settlers. The plaintiffs’ motion denied; defendants’ motion
granted.
96.
U.S. v. Puyallup Tribe of Indians, No. C13–5122, 2014 WL 1386553
(W.D. Wash. 2014). This matter was before the Court on plaintiff United States of
America's (“Government”) motion for summary judgment and defendant Puyallup Tribe
of Indians' (“Tribe”) motion for summary judgment. The Government filed a complaint
against the Tribe asserting a claim for the alleged failure to honor an Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”) Tax Levy. Joshua D. Turnipseed (“Turnipseed”) is an enrolled member
of the Tribe and owed back taxes to the Government. The Tribe, at the Tribal Council's
discretion, distributes per capita payments each month to qualified members such as
Turnipseed. The Government issued a levy to the Tribe for Turnipseed's wages, salary,
or other income in an attempt to collect Turnipseed's liabilities. The Tribe issued per
capita payments to Turnipseed despite the levy, and the Government filed this action.
The parties disputed whether the per capita payments were “property” or “rights to
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property” and whether the per capita payments were “fixed and determinable” under
federal law. The parties also disputed the applicable law (state, tribal, or federal) and
the characterization of future per capita payments. The Court granted the Tribe's
motion for summary judgment and denied the Government's motion for summary
judgment.
97.
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, No. 13–10566,
2014 WL 1760855, 750 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2014). An Indian tribe brought an action
seeking declaratory judgment that the tribe was exempt from paying state tax on fuel
and injunction requiring refund of taxes paid. The District Court, 917 F. Supp. 2d 1255,
dismissed the complaint, and the tribe appealed. The Appellate Court held that: (1) the
state's sovereign immunity barred action, and (2) the action did not fall within scope of
Ex parte Young exception to state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Affirmed.
98.
State, ex rel. Pruitt v. Native Wholesale Supply, No. 111985, 2014 WL
2620019, 338 P.3d 613 (Okla. 2014). Attorney General initiated proceeding against
cigarette importer and distributor, which was a tribally-chartered corporation wholly
owned by an individual of Native American ancestry, alleging violations of the Oklahoma
Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act. The importer/distributor filed a
motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.
The District Court denied the motion as to personal jurisdiction, but granted motion upon
finding that enforcement of the Complementary Act against importer/distributor would
have violated the Indian Commerce Clause, depriving the court of subject matter
jurisdiction. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court, 237 P.3d 199, affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, the District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Attorney General. Importer/distributor appealed. The Supreme
Court held that: (1) the district court was bound on remand by facts supporting
Supreme Court’s jurisdictional holdings in previous appeal; (2) the importer/distributor
was not entitled to jury trial; and (3) the importer/distributor’s actions violated the
Oklahoma Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act. Affirmed.
99.
Westmoreland Resources Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, No. DA 13–0547,
2014 WL 3842978, 330 P.3d 1188 (Mont. 2014). Coal producer and Department of
Revenue filed joint petition for interlocutory adjudication of substantive question of law,
requesting determination as to whether it was proper to have deduction taken from the
producer for coal severance and gross proceeds taxes paid to Indian tribe, as owner of
coal, to reduce the amount owning under Resource Indemnity Trust and Ground Water
Assessment Tax. The First Judicial District Court held in favor of Department.
Producer appealed. The Supreme Court held that taxes that producer paid to tribe were
not taxes paid on production subject to deduction from contract sales price. Affirmed.
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M. Trust Breach and Claims
100. Klamath Claims Comm. v. U.S., No. 2012–5130, 2013 WL 4494383
(Fed. Cir. 2013). The Klamath Claims Committee (KCC) appealed two judgments of the
Court of Federal Claims. The first was the Court’s decision to dismiss the third and
fourth claims of the KCC’s first amended complaint pursuant to Rule 19 of the Court of
Federal Claims. The Appellate Court affirmed that judgment. The second was the
Court’s dismissal of the KCC’s motion seeking leave to amend its complaint for the
second time. The Court affirmed that decision, but write briefly to address its reasoning
for doing so. The Klamath and Modoc Tribes and the Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians
comprise one federally-recognized tribal government (the “Tribes”). Pursuant to its
constitution and by-laws, the Tribes passed a resolution in 1952 to create the KCC. At
that time, the Tribes anticipated the termination of its federal recognition, which later
occurred through the Klamath Termination Act of 1954. The KCC’s purpose was to
represent the interests of the Tribes’ final enrollees (the “1954 Enrollees”) in claims
against the United States filed before and after termination. A “reserve of necessary
funds for prosecution” of such claims (the “Litigation Fund”) was created in 1958 from
monies due under the Termination Act. In 1986, the Tribes regained federal recognition
under the Klamath Indian Tribe Restoration Act. After the federally-recognized
sovereignty of the Tribes was restored, the KCC continued to exist. The Tribal Council
(the elected governmental body for the Tribes) appears to have supervised the KCC’s
post-restoration activities, including the disbursement of money from the Litigation Fund.
The present suit began with a complaint filed by the KCC in February 2009. An
amended complaint included four claims. The first two alleged wrongdoings by the
government related to funds payable to the Tribes and its members under Section 13 of
the Termination Act. The third and fourth claims asserted a taking of private property
and breach of fiduciary duty arising from the removal of the Chiloquin Dam – an act that
allegedly affected water flow and fishing in waterways used by the Tribes. Shortly after
the amended complaint was filed, the government moved to dismiss all four claims,
arguing that the KCC lacked standing to bring its claims. It asserted that the KCC did
not have a legally cognizable interest in the Section 13 funds, the Chiloquin Dam, or the
tribal water and fishing rights that were apparently affected by the dam’s removal.
According to the government, the KCC failed to show that “it, instead of the
Tribes, [was] the proper entity to assert [its] claims.” Shortly after the KCC filed its
motion to amend, the Court of Federal Claims ruled that dismissal under Rule 19 was
appropriate because the Tribes was an indispensable party for the third and fourth
claims of the amended complaint. In addition to citing concerns and respect for the
Tribes’ sovereignty and the risk of “multiple and conflicting claims” against the
government, the Court reasoned that the resolution of the third and fourth claims in the
amended complaint required adjudication of substantial tribal interests in water and
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fishing rights that “might be impaired by an adverse ruling.” The KCC filed a timely
appeal.
Applying Rule 19 factors here, the Court held that the Tribes were an
indispensable party for the claims the KCC sought to add in its motion to amend. The
Tribes were clearly a required party for those claims, and the first Rule 19 factor
weighed quite heavily in favor of dismissal. The resolution of the KCC’s new claims
would necessarily implicate significant sovereign interests of the Tribes and risk
substantial prejudice to it.
101. Fletcher v. United States, No. 12–5078, 2013 WL 5184985 (10th Cir.
2013). Tribal members brought an action against the federal government, seeking an
accounting to determine whether the federal government had fulfilled the fiduciary
obligations it chose to assume, as trustee, to oversee the collection of royalty income
from oil and gas reserves and its distribution to tribal members. The District Court, 2012
WL 1109090, dismissed the tribal members’ claims, and they appealed. The Appellate
Court held that American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act imposed on the
federal government a duty to provide an accounting of royalty income from oil and gas
reserves held in trust and its distribution to tribal members. Reversed and remanded.
102. Wolfchild, et al. v. U.S., Nos. 2012–5035, 2012–5036, 2012–5043, 2013
WL 5405505 (Fed. Cir. 2013). (From the opinion.) The United States currently holds
certain tracts of land in Minnesota in trust for three Indian communities. It originally
acquired some of that land in the late 1800s, using funds appropriated by Congress to
help support a statutorily identified group of Indians, and held it for the benefit of those
Indians and their descendants for decades. As time passed, that beneficiary group and
the three present-day communities that grew on these lands overlapped but diverged:
many of the beneficiary group were part of the communities, but many were not; and the
communities included many outside the beneficiary group. In 1980, Congress
addressed the resulting land use problems by putting the lands into trust for the three
communities that had long occupied them. Ever since, proceeds earned from the
lands—including profits from gaming—have gone to the same three communities. The
discrepancy between the makeup of the three communities and the collection of
descendants of the Indians designated in the original appropriations acts underlies the
present dispute, which was before this court once before. Claimants alleged that they
belonged to the latter group and that they, rather than the communities, held rights to
the land at issue and any money generated from it. Four years ago, based on an
extensive analysis of the relevant laws and history, the Court rejected what was then
the only live claim, which got to the heart of their assertion: that the appropriations acts
created a trust for the benefit of the statutorily designated Indians and their
descendants. Wolfchild v.. United States, 559 F.3d 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2009). On remand,
claimants advanced several new claims, some of which seek proceeds generated from
the lands, others of which seek more. Again unable to find that claimants have stated a
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claim that meets the standards of governing law, we now reject these new claims,
including the one that the Court of Federal Claims held valid in the judgment the Courts
reviewed. We therefore reversed the Claims Court’s judgment against the United
States on the claim to pre 1980 money and affirmed its judgment against claimants on
the remainder of the proposed claims.
103. Hopi Tribe v. United States, No. 12–45, 2013 WL 5496957 (Fed. Cl.
2013). Plaintiff, an Indian tribe, brought suit to recover damages for breach of trust.
The alleged breach consisted of defendant’s supposed failure to ensure that the water
supply on the plaintiff’s reservation contained safe levels of arsenic. Before the Court
was the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, in which the
defendant asserted that the plaintiff failed to identify an applicable fiduciary duty.
Plaintiff was a federally recognized Indian Tribe residing on the Hopi Reservation (the
“Reservation”) in Arizona. Although the land was uninhabitable without drinking water,
the public water systems serving villages on the eastern portion of the Reservation
contained levels of arsenic higher than what Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
regulations permit. Plaintiff brought this suit claiming that defendant, through the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) committed a breach of trust by failing to provide plaintiff
with an adequate supply of drinking water. Plaintiff claimed that defendant’s trust duties
flowed from an executive order creating the Reservation (the “Executive Order of 1882”)
and a subsequent Act of Congress incorporating the requirements of that Executive
Order by reference (the “Act of 1958”). According to plaintiff, by establishing the
Reservation and holding the land in trust, the Executive Order of 1882 and the Act of
1958 created a duty on the part of defendant to protect the trust property, including the
Reservation’s water supply. Plaintiff asserted that defendant breached this duty by
failing to ensure that the arsenic level in the water supply complied with EPA standards.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
contending that plaintiff failed to identify a source of law creating a legally enforceable
duty, requiring defendant to provide a certain quality of drinking water to the
Reservation.
According to defendant, neither the Executive Order of 1882 nor the Act of 1958
imposes such a duty. Defendant conceded that it held plaintiff’s water rights in trust but
argues that this general trust relationship does not suffice to establish a specific trust
duty to maintain water quality. Defendant also argued that the sources of law plaintiff
identified in its complaint cannot “fairly be interpreted” as mandating compensation.
Finally, defendant averred that that Congress has provided a civil remedy for violations
of the Safe Drinking Water Act and that the Court ought not interpret a statute or
regulation to be money-mandating where, “Congress has provided an alternative
remedy for the alleged wrongful conduct.” The Court found that neither the Executive
Order of 1882 nor the Act of 1958 expressly imposed a duty on defendant to protect the
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quality of plaintiff’s water supply and that because the plaintiff failed to clear the first
“hurdle” in establishing this Court’s jurisdiction, the Court need not consider whether any
provision plaintiff cited can “fairly be interpreted” as mandating compensation.
The Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
104. Beattie v. Smith, No. 13–3053, 2013 WL 5995621 (10th Cir. 2013). After
being arrested at a resort operated by Native American tribe and charged with lewd and
lascivious behavior and disorderly conduct, arrestee was tried and acquitted in state
court, and subsequently brought civil rights action against the tribe, its Tribal Police
Department, certain tribal police officers and resort security personnel, asserting claims
under § 1983 and Kansas law. The District Court granted tribal entities’ motion to
dismiss and granted the individual defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Arrestee appealed. The Appellate Court held that: (1) the tribal police officers had
probable cause to arrest; (2) the arrestee’s state law claim that officers’ investigation
before arresting him was inadequate was barred by discretionary function exception of
Kansas Tort Claims Act; (3) the allegation that security personnel caused officers to
conduct an abbreviated investigation, leading to arrest, was insufficient to support claim
for false arrest under Kansas law; (4) the allegation that security personnel “expressly
requested [his] arrest” by officers was insufficient to support claim for false arrest
against security personnel under Kansas law; and (5) the allegation that security
personnel possessed information that tended to discredit the witness’s claim that she
saw him masturbating in front of hotel window, but never requested that officers drop
criminal case against him, was insufficient to support claim for malicious prosecution
against security personnel under Kansas law. Affirmed.
105. Loya v. Gutierrez, No. 32,405, 2013 WL 6044354, 319 P.3d 656 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2013). Arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a tribal police officer, alleging
false arrest, malicious prosecution, and excessive force. Officer filed third-party
declaratory judgment action against the county, alleging the county was required to
defend and indemnify him. The District Court granted summary judgment for the
county. Officer appealed. The Appellate Court held that: (1) the officer was not law
enforcement officer under the Tort claims Act, and (2) the officer was not a public
employee. Affirmed.
106. Wyandot Nation of Kansas v. United States, No. 06–919, 2014 WL
1379106, 115 Fed. Cl. 595 (Fed. Cl. 2014). Before the Court was the defendant's
motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the
Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims. The government argued that the
pendency of a previously filed case in a U.S. District Court precluded the Court’s
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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1500. On December 28, 2006, plaintiff, Wyandot Nation
of Kansas (Wyandot Nation), brought a claim in the Court of Federal Claims against the
government. Plaintiff sought money damages to compensate it for various breaches of
fiduciary duty that it claimed the government committed as trustee of a trust holding
assets for its benefit. On December 30, 2005, before filing its action in the Court of
Federal Claims, plaintiff filed a case in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia seeking relief for the government's alleged breach of fiduciary duty in
connection with the same trust. On July 13, 2006, the plaintiff filed an amended
complaint in the District Court alleging defective trust accounting. In the District Court,
the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief to compel a proper accounting and
injunctive relief to compel proper management of its trust accounts. Several months
later, the plaintiff brought its claim against the United States for money damages in the
Court of Federal Claims. Plaintiff sought consequential damages, incidental damages,
compound interest, pre-judgment interest, court costs, and attorneys' fees – all related
to the defendant's breach of the fiduciary duties outlined above. The Court concluded
that the plaintiff's previously-filed district court complaint contained operative facts which
substantially overlapped those of the above-captioned case and that § 1500 precluded
the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court granted the government's motion to dismiss.
107. Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty v. New York, No. 13–3069, 756 F.3d 163,
2014 WL 2782191 (2d Cir. 2014). An Indian tribe brought an action against the State of
New York and certain state officials and agencies, counties, towns, and villages,
alleging the tribe, and not the State, had title to 36 square mile tract of land in upstate
New York. The District Court, 2013 WL 3822093, granted the defendants’ motions to
dismiss, and the tribe appealed. The Appellate Court held that equitable principles of
laches, acquiescence, and impossibility barred tribe’s claims. Affirmed.
108. Winnemucca Indian Colony v. United States, No. 13–874, 2014 WL
3107445 (Fed. Cl. 2014). Before the Court was an action for breach of trust brought by
plaintiffs, Winnemucca Indian Colony and Chairman Willis Evans (the Colony).
Defendant, the United States, (government) moved to dismiss the complaint. In their
complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the United States has committed a breach of trust and a
breach of fiduciary duty in connection with actions taken by the United States Bureau of
Indian Affairs in failing to recognize the Colony’s tribal government and, inter alia, for
allowing non-Colony members to occupy and use Colony land. As a result of these
alleged breaches, plaintiffs sought $108,000,000 and a declaratory judgment entitling
the Colony to past, present, and future compensation, among other relief. In August
2011, the Winnemucca Colony filed a case against the United States in the United
States District Court for the District of Nevada that raised similar claims. The Court
agreed with the government that § 1500 bars the Court from considering Counts One,
Two, and Three of plaintiffs’ complaint and that Counts Three and Four also must be
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dismissed as seeking relief outside the jurisdiction of the court.
motion to dismiss the complaint was granted.

The government’s

N. Miscellaneous
109. Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe v. St. Monica Dev., No. B238603, 2013 WL
5976240 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). In 1994, the Gabrielino–Tongva people were recognized
by the State of California as “the aboriginal tribe of the Los Angeles Basin.” Currently in
California there are several associations of descendants of this historic Native American
tribe. This appeal concerned two different groups of people claiming the right to control
one such association, the Gabrielino–Tongva Tribe. One of these two factions
(appellant) initiated the lawsuit against defendants (respondents); the other tribal entity
settled the claims against defendants. Defendants moved for summary judgment based
on that settlement. The Trial Court determined there was no triable issue of material
fact concerning the authority of the settling faction to act on behalf of the Tribe and
entered judgment for defendants. The Appellate Court determined there were triable
issues of material fact preventing a summary disposition of the matter. The Appellate
Court reversed the judgment and the order granting respondents’ motion for summary
judgment.
110. W.I.H. ex rel. Heart v. Winner School Dist. 59-2, No. CIV 06–3007
(D.S.D. 2014). Plaintiffs instituted this action contending that the defendants punish
Native American students more harshly and more frequently than similarly situated
Caucasian students, that the defendant District maintains a racially hostile educational
environment, and engages in racially discriminatory policies, customs, and practices.
This matter was certified as a class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 on behalf of the
following class of plaintiffs: All Native American students currently enrolled or who will
in the future enroll in Winner Middle School or Winner High School. Class counsel and
counsel for the defendants filed a joint motion for approval of a settlement and proposed
consent decree. Notices of the proposed settlement and of a fairness hearing were
given to the class members. A consent decree was entered on December 10, 2007.
Counsel filed a joint motion for approval of an amended consent decree. Notices of the
proposed amended consent decree and of a fairness hearing were given to the class
members. No objections were filed. The original consent decree set forth a plan for
developing and implementing certain “benchmarks,” i.e., programs or objectives
designed to remedy the claimed hostile environment at the Winner Schools. The
original consent decree was to remain in effect until the defendants complied with all
benchmarks for four consecutive school years, at which time the decree would
automatically terminate. The benchmark committee met in May and July of 2013, and
determined that the benchmarks should be revised. The parties have agreed to amend
the original consent decree to refer to “benchmarks” as “actions,” and “item goals” as
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“outcome measures.”
The proposed amendment to the consent decree was
contemplated by the original consent decree as part of continuing monitoring of the
District's compliance and the parties desire to remedy the conditions existing at the time
the class action was filed. The amendments are consistent with the original consent
decree's purpose. The amended consent decree is fair, reasonable, and adequate to
continue to redress the claims of current and future class members and is approved.
111. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Harrison, Nos. 43451-2-II, 43751-1II, 2014 WL 2547601 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). Lender brought breach of contract action
against borrowers for failure to pay promissory note based on a line of credit. The
Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of lender in the amount of
$161,831.97, but ruled that the borrower’s personal bank account containing proceeds
from the sale of her Indian trust land were exempt from garnishment. Lender appealed.
The Appellate Court held that: (1) the lender was judicially estopped from arguing on
appeal that borrowers failed to prove the factual basis for their exemption, i.e., that the
funds in the Native American borrower’s bank accounts derived from leases of Indian
trust land; (2) the Superior Court had the jurisdiction to resolve the issue of whether the
statute excluded proceeds from the sale of Indian trust land, from liability for the
payment of a debt that arose during the trust period, continued to protect any such
moneys that had been placed in a Native American’s personal bank account; (3) the
federal statute that provided that moneys from the lease or sale of Indian trust lands
was not liable for certain debts provided protection against the garnishment of the
money in the borrower’s bank accounts that had accrued from the lease of borrower’s
Indian trust lands, regardless of whether the moneys accrued to an Individual Indian
Money (IIM) account or directly to the Native American borrower; and (4) the lender was
entitled to recover its attorney fees and costs incurred in responding to borrowers’
appeal. Affirmed.
112. Pederson v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., No. S–15056, 2014 WL
3883431, 331 P.3d 384 (Alaska 2014). Arctic Slope Regional Corporation is an Alaska
Native Regional Corporation organized under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
and AS 10.06.960 and incorporated under the Alaska Corporations Code, AS 10.06. At
the time of trial, the Corporation took in about $2.5 billion in revenue each year,
employed about 10,000 people, and had operations across the country and around the
world. The Corporation had about 11,000 shareholders in 2012, about 6,000 of whom
were adults holding voting shares. Rodney Peterson is an original shareholder of the
Corporation, holding 100 Class A shares. An attorney and a member of the Alaska bar,
Pederson worked as assistant corporate counsel to the Corporation and later as an
executive for one of the Corporation’s subsidiaries. The employment relationship
soured. Pederson sought to exercise his statutory right to inspect books and records of
account and minutes of board and committee meetings relating to executive
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compensation and an alleged transfer of equity in corporate subsidiaries to executives.
The Corporation claimed that the materials were confidential and sought to negotiate a
confidentiality agreement prior to release of any documents. This appeal presented
several issues of first impression in Alaska.
The court held that (1) the statutory phrase “books and records of account”
includes electronically maintained books and records of account; (2) the statutory
phrase also goes beyond mere annual reports and proxy statements; and (3) the
statutory phrase at least encompasses monthly financial statements, records of
receipts, disbursements and payments, accounting ledgers, and other financial
accounting documents, including records of individual executive compensation and
transfers of corporate assets or interests to executives. The Court further held that (4)
the statutory category “minutes” does not encompass all presentations or reports made
to the board but rather merely requires a record of the items addressed and actions
taken at the meeting, as have been faithfully recorded after the meeting. Finally, the
Court held that (5) a corporation may request a confidentiality agreement as a
prerequisite to distributing otherwise-inspectable documents provided that the
agreement reasonably defines the scope of confidential information subject to the
agreement and contains confidentiality provisions that are not unreasonably restrictive
in light of the shareholder’s proper purpose and the corporation’s legitimate
confidentiality concerns. The Court concluded that the Corporation’s proffered
confidentiality agreement in this case was not sufficiently tailored or limited in scope and
thus Pederson’s refusal to sign it could not serve as a legal basis for avoiding liability for
denying his inspection claims. The Appellate Court reversed the Superior Court’s
judgment, vacated the Superior Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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